THREE ESSAYS ON CONTEST THEORY by WANG ZHE
THREE ESSAYS ON CONTEST THEORY
ZHE WANG
(B.Soc.Sci. and B.Eng., National University of Singapore,
Singapore)
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS




This PhD thesis would not have been possible without the guidance of pro-
fessors, the assistance of colleagues, the support of friends, and the inspiration
of family. At the moment, I would like to thank all people that helped me in
the study and research over the past years.
First and foremost, I would like to express the deepest gratitude to my su-
pervisor, Professor Lu Jingfeng, for his invaluable advice, guidance, patience
and encouragement rendered during these four years. His unparalleled dedi-
cation and constant motivation inspire me to advance my research skills, work
hard in writing the thesis, and prepare me for the challenges in future. It is
absolutely my honour to complete my PhD thesis under his supervision and
instruction.
Moreover, I would like to be sincerely grateful to my coauthors, Professor
Liu Haoming, Yohanes Eko Riyanto, and Dr Ma Hongkun for their outstand-
ing work on the writing of first and second chapters. I really appreciate their
positive attitude and great effort in the cooperation. I would like to thank Pro-
fessor Chen Yi-Chun, Ko Chiu Yu, Satoru Takahashi, Luo Xiao, and Parimal
Bag for their kind guidance, insightful comment and constructive suggestion
in graduate research seminars. I have benefited a lot from them in revising
and improving my PhD thesis.
ii
In addition, I would like to thank all my classmates and friends in depart-
ment of Economics for all of the joy, pleasure, and friendship we had. I will
always remember the support of my friends when I struggled with my research.
I really enjoy the time we spent together.
Last but not least, I would like to sincerely thank my family for supporting
my overseas study throughout these years and for encouraging me overcome
all the difficulties I encountered. More importantly, I cannot imagine any more
fortune in my life to start a new journey with my wife, Mrs Yan Yuchen, to
face the challenges together and to share the happiness together. It is her
precious love and endless support that keep me moving forward without any
hesitation and fear. My PhD thesis is dedicated to my family and my wife.
iii
Contents
1 Ranking Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Equilibrium Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Full Disclosure Policy (D,D,D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 Partial Disclosure Policy (D,C,C) . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Partial Disclosure Policy (C,C,D) . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.4 Full Concealment Policy (C,C,C) . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Ranking Disclosure Policies by Aggregate Effort . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.1 Total Expected Effort under Each Policy . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.2 Comparison and Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Ranking Disclosure Policies by Players’ Payoffs . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.1 Players’ Payoffs under Each Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.2 Comparison and Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
iv
1.6 Ranking Disclosure Policies by Allocative Efficiency . . . . . . 32
1.6.1 Allocative Efficiency under Each Disclosure Policy . . . 33
1.6.2 Comparison and Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2 Rank Order Contests with Sabotage: Equilibrium Analysis
and Optimal Design 40
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3.1 The Equivalent Single-Dimensional Optimization . . . 54
2.3.2 Characterization of Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.3 The Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4 The Optimal Design of Pay Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3 Comparing Rank Order Contests and Piece Rate Contracts:
The Case with Sabotage 84
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3 Analysis of rank order contest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
v
3.3.1 Maximizing expected payoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.3.2 Maximizing expected profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.4 Analysis of piece rate contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.5 The Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Bibliography 140
Appendices 152
A Proofs of Chapter One 152
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
A.6 Proof of Lemma 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
B Proofs of Chapter Two 177
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
vi
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
B.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
B.8 Proof of Corollary 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
B.9 Proof of Lemma 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
B.10 Proof of Corollary 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
B.11 Proof of Corollary 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
B.12 Proof of Corollary 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
C Proofs of Chapter Three 201
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
vii
Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters. The first chapter is on
information disclosure policies in all-pay auctions, and the second and third
chapter are on equilibrium analysis and optimal design of rank order contest
with sabotage as well as the comparison with piece rate contract.1
The first chapter extends the existing literature on information disclosure
by analyzing and ranking disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with incom-
plete information. There are two symmetric players whose values of the prize
can be high or low, which is their private information. The contest organizer
observes the players’ values after the information of value is realized, and she
can commit ex ante to four different symmetric information policies exhaus-
tively. We explicitly characterize the unique equilibrium for each scenario.
Based on the equilibrium analysis, we are able to completely rank the four
disclosure policies by the expected effort induced, the players’ expected pay-
offs, and the allocative efficiency. We find that the full concealment policy
extracts the highest aggregate expected effort, which is followed by the policy
of disclosing types if and only if both are high. The policy of disclosing types if
1The first chapter is co-authored with Professor Jingfeng Lu (my supervisor) and Dr
Hongkun Ma, while the second chapter is co-authored with Professor Haoming Liu, Professor
Jingfeng Lu and Professor Yohanes E. Riyanto.
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and only if both are low induces the least total expected effort. Players enjoy
the highest expected payoffs under the policy of disclosing types when both
are low; the other three policies yield the same expected payoffs to players. In
terms of prize allocation efficiency, the full concealment policy is ranked the
highest and the full disclosure policy is ranked the lowest. In between, the
other two policies’ rankings depend on the probability of high-type players.
Rank order contest schemes are widely adopted as incentive mechanisms
to tackle moral hazard issues and to motivate workers to achieve better per-
formance. Allowing workers to exert both productive and sabotage effort, the
second chapter extends the literature of contest theory by establishing the ex-
istence and uniqueness of pure-strategy equilibrium in two-worker rank order
contests with sabotage and interdependent effects of productive and sabotage
effort. In the equilibrium, both players will sabotage if the pay dispersion is
larger than the upper threshold and neither sabotages if it is smaller than the
lower threshold. If it lies between the two thresholds, a unique equilibrium
prevails where only the more sabotage efficient player sabotages, regardless of
the efficiency of their productive efforts. For symmetric workers, it is optimal
to set a pay dispersion that induces positive sabotage if and only if sabotage
is less effective and the marginal cost of sabotage is small. The optimal pay
dispersion decreases with the effectiveness and increases with the marginal
ix
cost of sabotage, but it does not change monotonically with the effectiveness
of productive effort.
The third chapter further compares two reward schemes of the rank order
contest (relative performance evaluation) and the piece rate contract (absolute
performance evaluation) from the principal’s perspective. In the model, two
symmetric risk-neutral workers have the choices of making productive effort
or sabotage effort targeting the other. We first pin down the optimal design
and identify the principal’s maximum expected profits from the two reward
schemes, which depend on both the unit price of output and structural parame-
ters, such as the effectiveness of productive and sabotage effort. By comparing
maximal expected profits in individual ranges, we show that neither reward
scheme dominates the other when workers can make both productive and sab-
otage effort, and establish the existence and uniqueness of the critical price
at which the difference between the maximum expected profits of two reward
schemes is zero. Moreover, the optimal rank order contest is superior to the
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Chapter 1
Ranking Disclosure Policies in
All-Pay Auctions
1.1 Introduction
Contests are abundant in reality. In many economic and social interactions,
such as R&D races; bidding for procurement contracts; lawsuits/litigation;
policy debates; legislative, lobbying, and electoral campaigns; and sports, op-
posing parties expend nonrefundable and costly effort to get ahead of their
rivals. Contests are employed to serve different purposes in different contexts.
The performance of a contest can therefore be measured along different di-
mensions, including effort elicitation, prize allocative efficiency, players’ pay-
offs, etc.1 For example, in R&D races and sports, designers usually target
inducing more productive effort supply from players; in lobbying and electoral
campaigns, in contrast, one might wish to reduce socially wasteful rent-seeking
1Refer to Konrad (2009) for a comprehensive review of the contest literature.
1
activities. Allocation efficiency is also a popular indicator of contest perfor-
mance in many situations, such as competitions for procurement contracts and
electoral campaigns, in which contests are used as an effective screening mech-
anism to identify the most able or most qualified. In many cases, contestants’
payoffs are taken into account when designing the contest. Other things be-
ing equal, a design that delivered higher payoffs to contestants would improve
social efficiency.
When firms compete for a government construction project by submitting
application documents, the effort they exert in preparing the documents in case
that they ignore the list of contestants will largely change compared with that
they are informed to be competing against powerful or mediocre firms. The
government thus might be strategic in deciding whether to publicly disclose
on the web page the list of the firms competing for the project. Consider
another example, lobbyists with specific political purposes who spend different
amounts of resources to influence legislation when they have different beliefs
about the opponents. Specifically, if they think the lobbying competition is a
close contest, they tend to exert more effort; in contrast, if they surmise that
competitors have significantly more influence, they tend to be discouraged.
The legislative institution may also strategically disclose the information about
lobbyists.
2
Contests provide an excellent context to study the role of information de-
sign in regulating players’ performance.2 Strategically interacting contestants
are rational Bayesian players who form their beliefs and take actions based on
the information provided. For a given contest technology and prize structure,
the designer can induce more desirable behavior from contestants by carefully
choosing the information they observe when competing. In this paper, we
examine information design in an all-pay auction environment with incom-
plete information.3 Specifically, in our setting there are two symmetric players
whose values can be high (denoted by h) or low (denoted by l), which is their
private information.4 The contest organizer or a third party who observes the
players’ values may consider how much information to disclose to better incen-
tivize the agents and improve the performance of the contest.5 In this paper,
we accommodate four exhaustive anonymous information disclosure policies
the contest organizer can commit to, and provide a complete ranking of all
2We borrowed the term “information design” from Taneva (2016).
3In reality, a player likely has private information about his innate ability, physical or
intellectual strength, comparative initial advantage, valuation for the prize and so forth.
4Equivalently, we can adopt a setting in which players alternatively have different bidding
costs that represent their abilities.
5There are many situations in which players’ information about their opponents is lim-
ited, while the contest organizer or a third party is better informed. For instance, in pro-
curement contests for government construction projects, the firms bidding for the designing
and contracting generally do not have complete information about their competitors, while
the contest organizer can typically access that information from the firms’ application doc-
uments. The firms participating in procurement contests are required to truthfully present
their capabilities and financial conditions, or otherwise they face an immense risk of being
punished by regulatory authorities or prohibited from procurement contests in future.
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these disclosure policies according to performance measures of effort elicita-
tion, players’ payoffs, and allocation efficiency, respectively.6 These rankings
will provide guidance for the choice of an appropriate information disclosure
policy when the designer has different contest performance indicators in mind.
We focus on anonymous disclosure policies in our analysis. Here, anony-
mous means that players’ type profiles do not distinguish between players’
identities, and the disclosure policy is the same for players for every type pro-
file. Ignoring the identities of the players, since each player has two types (h
and l), the possible type profiles are {h, h}, {h, l}, and {l, l}. An anonymous
disclosure policy thus specifies for each type profile whether to disclose it to
both players (henceforth, D, for disclosure), or conceal it from both players
(henceforth, C, for concealment). According to Serena’s (2016) classification,7
each possible anonymous disclosure policy must be equivalent to one of the
following four policies in terms of players’ beliefs. First, she can always dis-
close publicly the types of the players. We use (D,D,D) to denote this policy,
where the first D means disclosing when the profile is {h, h}; the second D
means disclosing when the profile is {h, l}; and the third D means disclosing
6Instead of making the assumption that the contest organizer commits to the information
disclosure policy which she announces before the players exert effort, one may also consider
the evaluation of the optimal policy based on the approach of mechanism design. However,
the assumed commitment of contest organizer significantly simplifies the equilibrium analysis
and relative comparison among different policies, and thus we do not have to focus on the
strategic interaction of players under various policies in the mechanism design.
7Refer to the proof of Theorem 2 in Serena (2016).
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when the profile is {l, l}. Under this policy, the contestants play a complete
information game when every possible type profile prevails. Second, she can
conceal the players’ types. Parallelly, we use (C,C,C) to denote this pol-
icy. Under this policy, the contestants play a standard incomplete information
game. Third, she can disclose publicly the players’ types if and only if both
are of high type. We thus use (D,C,C) to denote this policy. Under this
policy, the contestants play a complete information game when the profile is
{h, h}. When the profile is {l, l}, both believe the opponent is h or l type with
the prior probabilities. When profile {h, l} prevails, the h type would have
an information advantage, since he is able to deduce the opponent player’s
type, but the l type holds the prior belief about his opponent. Fourth, she
can disclose publicly the players’ types if and only if both are of low type. We
thus use (C,C,D) to denote this policy. Under this policy, the contestants
play a complete information game when the profile is {l, l}. When the profile
is {h, h}, both believe the opponent is h or l type with the prior probabilities.
When profile {h, l} prevails, the l type would have an information advantage
since he is able to deduce the opponent player’s type, but the h type holds the
prior belief about his opponent.
To conduct the performance comparison across different disclosure poli-
cies, it is essential to first conduct the equilibrium analysis under each pol-
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icy. It is clear under policy (D,D,D) that for each type profile, the unique
mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by Hillman and Riley (1989).8 Under
policy (C,C,C), the unique monotone equilibrium in mixed strategy can be
constructed following the general approach of Siegel (2014), who studies two-
player all-pay auctions with discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and
interdependent values.9,10 However, for policies (D,C,C) and (C,C,D), there
are no results we can immediately rely on to derive different types’ bidding
strategies when the organizer does not disclose the type profile. Specifically,
Siegel’s procedure is not applicable for the following reasons. Siegel requires
two important conditions. The first is a full support condition on the condi-
tional type distribution of players, which requires that all conditional proba-
bilities be well defined and strictly positive. In our analysis under (D,C,C)
and (C,C,D), this condition is violated.11 Secondly, Siegel requires a weak
monotonicity (WM) condition, which says that for any type of opponent, the
higher a player’s own type, the higher (weakly) the product of the player’s
own valuation and the conditional probability of the opponent’s type. In our
8Baye et al. (1993, 1996) present a complete characterization of the equilibrium set for
all-pay auctions with complete information.
9The conditions required by Siegel (2014) are satisfied under this policy.
10Amann and Leininger (1996) and Krishna and Morgan (1997) study all-pay auction
with affiliated and continuously distributed signals, and pin down the sufficient conditions
for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium. See also Lizzeri and Persico (2000)
and Lu and Parreiras (2016).
11The full support condition is violated, since under (D,C,C), when concealment happens
we have Pr(h|h) = 0; and under (C,C,D), when concealment happens we have Pr(l|l) = 0.
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analysis under (D,C,C), this condition is violated; under (C,C,D), this con-
dition is also violated when the probability of h type is sufficiently low.12 By
relaxing the monotonicity restriction, Rentschler and Turocy (2016) present
a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibriums, including non-
monotonic ones, in all-pay auctions. Their procedure also requires the full
support condition. We thus conduct our own equilibrium analysis, which dis-
covers the unique bidding equilibriums in mixed strategy for policies (D,C,C)
and (C,C,D). These equilibriums are in general nonmonotonic in the sense
that the two types’ bid intervals overlap with each other.
These equilibrium analyses enable us to study the rankings of the four
disclosure policies according to performance measures of aggregate total effort,
contestants’ payoffs, and prize allocation efficiency, respectively.
• Ranking by aggregate expected effort. We find that the full concealment
policy (C,C,C) extracts the highest aggregate expected effort, and the
policy of disclosing types if and only if both are low (i.e., (C,C,D)) in-
duces the least total expected effort. In between, the policy of disclosing
types if and only if both are high (i.e., (D,C,C)) elicits higher total
expected effort than the full disclosure policy (D,D,D).
12As Pr(h|h) = 0 under (D,C,C) when concealment happens, the WM condition is also
violated. For (C,C,D), the WM condition is only violated when the probability of h type
is sufficiently low. Details are provided in Section 3.
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• Ranking by players’ expected payoffs. Players enjoy the highest expected
payoffs under the policy (C,C,D), and the other three policies render
the same expected payoffs to the players.
• Ranking by prize allocation efficiency. The full concealment policy is
ranked the highest, as the prize is always allocated to a bidder with the
highest value under this policy. The full disclosure policy is ranked the
lowest. In between, the policy (D,C,C) elicits higher prize allocation
efficiency than policy (C,C,D) if and only if the probability of h type is
sufficiently low.
Our paper belongs to the literature on the comparison of information dis-
closure policies in auctions and contests. This issue has long been scrutinized
in the literature. Milgrom and Weber (1982) establish the linkage principle,
which says that a revenue-maximizing auctioneer would commit ex ante to fully
disclose all available information to the bidders. Hurley and Shogren (1998)
compare prize allocation efficiency across different information structures in
Tullock contests. Ganuza (2004) studies a revenue-maximizing auctioneer’s
incentive to release information about the object’s characteristics to bidders,
who refine their private valuations. He finds that the auctioneer is motivated
to release less information than would be efficient, and the amount of infor-
mation revealed increases with the level of competition. Morath and Mu¨nster
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(2008) compare the full disclosure policy and concealment policy for standard
auctions. They find that in all-pay auctions, contestants receive the same
expected payoff across the two informational structures, and concealment in-
duces higher aggregate expected effort. Fu et al. (2014) generalize Morath
and Mu¨nster’s insight by allowing for multiple prizes. Zhang and Zhou (2016)
further study the optimal disclosure policy from a Bayesian persuasion per-
spective. In a two-player Tullock contest with one-sided private information,
they find that there is no loss of generality to restrict to full disclosure and
full concealment if the contest organizer’s goal is to increase total effort. Aoy-
agi (2010) studies information revelation in a multi-stage tournament. The
comparison of disclosure policies based on the number of players has also been
well studied in auctions and contests with stochastic entry, including Higgins
et al. (1985), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Myerson and Wa¨rneryd (2006),
Mu¨nster (2006), Lim and Matros (2009), and Fu et al. (2011).13
Our paper is most closely related to Serena (2016) who studies informa-
tion disclosure in a two-player Tullock-style contest environment in which each
player has two private types. An important innovation of his analysis is to al-
low partial information disclosure policies, i.e., (D,C,C) and (C,C,D). In
13Our paper is also related to the literature on players’ incentive to acquire and share
information in different auction formats, such as Persico (2000), Yildirim (2005), Compte
and Jehiel (2007), Szech (2011), Morath and Mu¨nster (2013), Denter et al. (2014), and
Kovenock et al. (2015).
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spite of the difficulty in explicitly characterizing the bidding strategies, Serena
successfully identifies the disclosure policy that generates the highest expected
total effort, even though a complete ranking of all feasible policies is impossi-
ble. While Serena considers sufficiently noisy Tullock contests that guarantee
the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium, our paper complements his study
by considering an all-pay auction environment that generally leads to mixed-
strategy equilibrium. An advantage of this setting is that it allows us to
explicitly characterize the equilibrium under each disclosure policy, which fur-
ther enables us to carry out a complete ranking of the policies along different
dimensions of performance indicators.
Our analysis will also reveal how the policies’ contest performance rank-
ings depend on the prevailing contest technology. In particular, these rankings
would serve as a robustness check of Serena’s results. In his Tullock setting,
policy (D,C,C) induces the highest total effort, while in our all-pay auction
setting, the full concealment policy (C,C,C) generates the highest total effort.
In addition, we find that in an all-pay auction, policy (C,C,D) induces the
least total expected effort. We thus confirm Serena’s finding that allowing
partial information disclosure policies would improve the contest design if the
performance measure is total effort. However, while Serena finds that this af-
fects the highest total effort in Tullock contests, we find that this would instead
10
affect the lowest total effort in an all-pay auction. If the performance measure
is the players’ payoffs, we find that allowing a partial information disclosure
policy would enhance the highest expected player payoffs, but it would not
affect their lowest expected payoffs. Nevertheless, allowing partial informa-
tion disclosure would not affect the best and worst contest performance if the
indicator is prize allocation efficiency. Our rankings on contest performance
(total effort and players’ payoffs) are consistent with the findings of Morath
and Mu¨nster (2008) and Fu et al. (2014), who focus on comparing full disclo-
sure and full concealment in all-pay auctions with a general number of players
and continuous types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
two-player all-pay auction model, and presents four exhaustive information
disclosure policies. Section 3 demonstrates the unique equilibrium in mixed
strategy for each information disclosure policy. Section 4 continues with the
ranking of the information disclosure policies in terms of aggregate expected
effort. Section 5 shows the ranking of the disclosure policies based on the
expected payoff for each player. Section 6 shows the ranking of the disclosure
policies based on prize allocation efficiency. Section 7 offers some concluding
remarks and further discussion.
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1.2 The Model
We consider a single prize all-pay auction with two players of different private
types. The type space for each player i = 1, 2 is Θi = {h, l}, in which h means
the high type and l means the low type. An h type might have a high winning
value or a low bidding cost.14 We assume that if θi = h, the value of the prize
for player i is vh, and if θi = l, the value of the prize for player i is vl, where
vh > vl. The marginal bidding cost of the players is normalized as 1.
The common prior type distribution for player i = 1, 2 is as follows:
pi(h) = p and pi(l) = 1 − p, where p ∈ (0, 1). We assume that θ1 and
θ2 are independently distributed. Ignoring the identities of the players, the
possible type profiles of the two players are {h, h}, {h, l}, and {l, l}, with
Pr({h, h}) = p2, Pr({h, l}) = 2p(1− p), and Pr({h, l}) = (1− p)2.
Denote the effort of player i by xi. For an all-pay auction, the winning
probability of player i is specified as follows:
Pi(xi, x−i) =
{
1 if xi > x−i,
0 if xi < x−i.
If xi = x−i, the tie-breaking rule is typically endogenously determined as a
part of the equilibrium with P1(x1, x2) + P2(x1, x2) = 1.
14The two setups are strategically equivalent. In one way, we can express the expected
utility of the h type making an effort of xh as Eh = vh Pr(h type wins) − xh, where the
valuation of prize is vh and the marginal cost is normalized to be 1. In the other way, we
can express the expected utility as Eh = Pr(h type wins) − chxh, where the valuation of





In this all-pay auction, the two players compete for a single prize by ex-
pending costly and nonrecoverable effort to maximize their own payoffs. We
assume that the organizer (or a third party) can observe the type profile ex
post and can commit ex ante to different disclosure policies to influence play-
ers’ bidding behavior and improve the performance of the contest. In this
paper, we will study the ranking of disclosure policies based on three popular
measures: effort elicitation, players’ payoffs, and prize allocative efficiency.
We focus on anonymous disclosure policies. There are totally eight possible
information disclosure policies, i.e., P = {(d(h,h), d(h,l), d(l,l))|d(h,h), d(h,l), d(l,l) ∈
{D,C}}. According to Serena (2016)’s classification in his proof of Theorem
2, each possible anonymous disclosure policy must be equivalent to one of the
following four policies: (D,D,D), (C,C,C), (D,C,C), or (C,C,D), which are
described in details in section 1. We thus focus on these four policies in our
analysis.
The timing of the game is as follows:
Time 1: Before the players’ types are realized, the organizer announces
and commits to one information disclosure policy. Both players observe the
information disclosure policy announced by the organizer.
Time 2: Each player learns his own private type θi (i = 1, 2) without
observing the other’s type. Both players’ types are observed by the organizer.
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Time 3: The type information is disclosed or concealed by the organizer
according to the preannounced disclosure policy. The players simultaneously
choose nonnegative effort (x1, x2) based on their updated beliefs about their
opponent’s type. The winning rule is as specified at the beginning of this
section.
In the next section, we characterize the equilibrium under each disclosure
policy.
1.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium analysis for policies (D,D,D) and (C,C,C) can be carried out
based on extant results. Under full disclosure policy (D,D,D), contestants
play a complete information game when each possible type profile prevails.
For each type profile, a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium can be derived ac-
cording to Hillman and Riley (1989). Under full concealment policy (C,C,C),
contestants play a standard incomplete information game with discrete inde-
pendent signals and values. The unique monotone equilibrium in mixed strat-
egy can be constructed following the general approach of Siegel (2014), who
studies two-player all-pay auctions with discrete signal structure, correlated
signals, and interdependent values.
For partial disclosure policies (D,C,C) and (C,C,D), there are no extant
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results we can immediately rely on to derive different types’ bidding strategies
in the equilibrium of incomplete information all-pay auction when C happens.
Siegel’s (2014) procedure is no longer applicable for the following reasons.
He requires two important conditions. The first is a full support condition on
the conditional type distribution of players, which requires that all conditional
probabilities be well defined and strictly positive. This condition is violated for
policies (D,C,C) and (C,C,D), since under (D,C,C) we have Pr(h|h) = 0,
and under (C,C,D) we have Pr(l|l) = 0. Second, Siegel requires a weak mono-
tonicity (WM) condition, which says that for any type of opponent, the higher
a player’s own type, the higher (weakly) the product of the player’s own valu-
ation and the conditional probability of the opponent’s type. In our context,
WM is equivalent to Pr(h|h)vh > Pr(h|l)vl and Pr(l|h)vh > Pr(l|l)vl. Clearly
Pr(h|h)vh > Pr(l|h)vl cannot hold, as Pr(h|h) = 0 under policy (D,C,C).
Under (C,C,D), this condition is also violated when the probability of h type
is sufficiently low, i.e., p < vl
vh
. Rentschler and Turocy (2016) relax the mono-
tonicity restriction and present a construction that characterizes all symmetric
equilibriums (including the nonmonotonic ones) in all-pay auctions. Even so,
their procedure requires the full support condition.
We thus conduct our own equilibrium analysis for policies (D,C,C) and
(C,C,D), which discovers the unique bidding equilibriums in mixed strategy
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for these scenarios. These equilibriums are in general nonmonotonic, in the
sense that the two types’ bid intervals overlap with each other.
The equilibrium characterizations for different policies will be presented in
the following subsections.
1.3.1 Full Disclosure Policy (D,D,D)
For any type profiles—{h, h}, {h, l}, or {l, l}—under a policy of full disclosure,
the two contestants play a game of complete information. For each type profile,
the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium can be derived according to Hillman
and Riley (1989). The following proposition summarizes these results. Proofs
are omitted to save space.
Proposition 1.1. For the full disclosure policy (D,D,D), the (unique) equi-
librium mixed strategies are as follows.
(i) For type profile {h, h}, both players bid uniformly on [0, vh] with a zero
equilibrium expected payoff.
(ii) For type profile {l, l}, both players bid uniformly on [0, vl] with a zero equi-
librium expected payoff.
(iii) For type profile {h, l}, the h type bids uniformly on [0, vl], and the l type
bids uniformly on (0, vl] with probability
vl
vh
and bids at 0 with probability vh−vl
vh
.
The equilibrium expected payoff for the h type is vh − vl, and the equilibrium
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expected payoff for the l type is zero.
1.3.2 Partial Disclosure Policy (D,C,C)
For policy (D,C,C), the equilibrium when D action is taken by the organizer
is identical to case (i) in Proposition 1.1. We will not repeat it here. When C
action is taken by the organizer, the h type knows his opponent is definitely an
l type, whereas the l type does not know his rival’s type. The l type’s belief is
Pr(h|l) = p and Pr(l|l) = 1− p. The following proposition fully characterizes
the equilibrium when C occurs.
Proposition 1.2. For partial disclosure policy (D,C,C), the following is the
(unique) equilibrium in mixed strategy when C happens.
(i) The h type bids uniformly on [x, vl], where x =
(1−p)(vh−vl)
vh−(1−p)vl vl ∈ (0, vl); the
corresponding cumulative distribution function is
FCh (x) =
vh − (1− p)vl
pvhvl
x− (1− p)(vh − vl)
pvh
, ∀x ∈ [x, vl].
(ii) The l type bids on [0, vl] without gap and mass points; the corresponding









, ∀x ∈ [x, vl].
The equilibrium expected payoff for the h type is vh−vl; the equilibrium expected
payoff for the l type is zero.
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Proof. See Appendix A.1.
1.3.3 Partial Disclosure Policy (C,C,D)
For policy (C,C,D), the equilibrium strategy when D action is taken by the
organizer is identical to case (ii) in Proposition 1.1. When C action is taken by
the organizer, the l type knows his opponent is definitely an h type, whereas
the h type does not know his rival’s type. The h type’s belief is Pr(h|h) = p and
Pr(l|h) = 1− p. The following proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium
when C occurs. Recall that under (C,C,D), the WM condition of Siegel (2014)
is violated when the probability of h type is sufficiently low, i.e., p < vl
vh
.
We find that this threshold probability plays a key role in determining the
equilibrium.
Proposition 1.3. For partial disclosure policy (C,C,D), the following is the
(unique) equilibrium in mixed strategy when C occurs.
(i) When p < vl
vh
, the h type bids uniformly on [0, vl]; the l type bids uniformly
on (0, vl] with probability 1 − vh−vl(1−p)vh and bids 0 with probability
vh−vl
(1−p)vh . The











(1− p)vh , ∀x ∈ [0, vl]. (1.2)
The equilibrium expected payoff for the h type is vh − vl, and the equilibrium
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expected payoff for the l type is zero.
(ii) When p ≥ vl
vh
, the h type bids uniformly on [0, pvh], and the l type bids 0




, ∀x ∈ [0, pvh], (1.3)
FCl (x) = 1, ∀x ≥ 0. (1.4)
The equilibrium expected payoff for the h type is (1−p)vh, and the equilibrium
expected payoff for the l type is zero.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
1.3.4 Full Concealment Policy (C,C,C)
With the full concealment policy, neither player is able to infer the opponent’s
type. Thus, each player’s belief about the opponent’s type is the same as
the common prior distribution. For this standard incomplete information all-
pay auction with discrete signals, the full support and monotonicity conditions
required by Siegel (2014) are satisfied. We can thus follow Siegel’s constructive
approach to derive the unique equilibrium, which is presented in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.4. For full concealment policy (C,C,C), the (unique) equilib-
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, ∀x ∈ [(1− p)vl, (1− p)vl + pvh], (1.5)
Fl(x) =
x
(1− p)vl , ∀x ∈ [0, (1− p)vl]. (1.6)
The equilibrium expected payoff for the h type is (1 − p)(vh − vl), and the
equilibrium expected payoff for the l type is zero.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The above equilibrium analysis provides the explicit bidding functions for
every type profile under every disclosure policy. Based on these results, we are
ready to compare the disclosure policies according to aggregate effort, players’
payoffs, and prize allocative efficiency, respectively, in the next three sections.
1.4 Ranking Disclosure Policies by Aggregate
Effort
In this section, we consider the rankings of the information disclosure policies
in terms of aggregate expected effort. For this purpose, we first calculate the
expected total effort under each policy.
1.4.1 Total Expected Effort under Each Policy
Based on Propositions 1.1 to 1.4, direct calculations give the following results.
We use E(x) |P to denote the expected total effort under policy P .
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Lemma 1.1. (i) Under policy (D,D,D), we have
E(x) |(D,D,D)= p
2v2h + (1− p)vhvl + p(1− p)v2l
vh
. (1.7)
(ii) Under policy (D,C,C), we have
E(x) |(D,C,C)= p
2v2h + (1− p)2(1 + 2p)vhvl − (1− p)(1− 2p2)v2l
vh − (1− p)vl . (1.8)
(iii) Under policy (C,C,D), we have








E(x) |(C,C,D)= p2vh + (1− p)2vl, if p ≥ vl
vh
. (1.10)
(iv) Under policy (C,C,C), we have
E(x) |(C,C,C)= p2vh + (1− p2)vl. (1.11)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
1.4.2 Comparison and Explanation
First, we compare the full concealment policy with the (D,C,C) policy. By
(1.8) and (1.11), we have
E(x) |(C,C,C) −E(x) |(D,C,C) = p
2(1− p)(vh − vl)vl
vh − (1− p)vl . (1.12)
Since vh > vl and p ∈ (0, 1), we have E(x) |(C,C,C)> E(x) |(D,C,C).
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Next, we compare the (D,C,C) policy with the full disclosure policy. By
(1.7) and (1.8), we have
E(x) |(D,C,C) −E(x) |(D,D,D) = p(1− p)
2(vh − vl)2vl
vh (vh − (1− p)vl) > 0. (1.13)
Consequently, we have E(x) |(D,C,C)> E(x) |(D,D,D).
Last, we compare the full disclosure policy with the (C,C,D) policy. There
are two cases regarding the equilibrium of the (C,C,D) policy. On the one
hand, if p < vl
vh
, then by (1.7) and (1.9), we have
E(x) |(D,D,D) −E(x) |(C,C,D)= p
2(v2h − v2l )
vh
> 0. (1.14)
On the other hand, if p ≥ vl
vh
, then by (1.7) and (1.10), we have
E(x) |(D,D,D) −E(x) |(C,C,D)= p(1− p)(vh + vl)vl
vh
> 0. (1.15)
Consequently, we have E(x) |(D,D,D)> E(x) |(C,C,D) for both cases.
From the analysis above, we haveE(x) |(C,C,C)> E(x) |(D,C,C)> E(x) |(D,D,D)>
E(x) |(C,C,D). Results are summarized in Proposition 1.5.
Proposition 1.5. (Complete policy ranking by aggregate expected ef-
fort) The full concealment policy (C,C,C) extracts the highest aggregate ex-
pected effort, and policy (C,C,D) induces the lowest total effort. In between,
policy (D,C,C) elicits higher total effort than the full disclosure policy (D,D,D).
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Proposition 1.5 confirms the insight of Serena (2016): Allowing partial
disclosure policies improves the contest design. However, diverging from Ser-
ena, who adopts a Tullock contest that induces pure-strategy equilibrium, this
is true in our context of an all-pay auction when the organizer’s goal is to
minimize aggregate expected effort. Moreover, Serena finds that the full con-
cealment policy (C,C,C) can induce higher or lower total expected effort than
the full disclosure policy (D,D,D) depending on the magnitude of probabil-
ity p of h type happening, while in our setting the full concealment policy
(C,C,C) always induces higher effort. Our ranking results are consistent
with the findings of Morath and Mu¨nster (2008) and Fu et al. (2014), who
find that full concealment generates higher expected effort than full disclosure
in all-pay auctions with a general number of players and continuous types.
Under a specification of vh = 2 and vl = 1, Figure 1.1 illustrates the ranking
of aggregate expected effort, which is characterized in Proposition 1.5.
The intuition behind the comparison in Proposition 1.5 can be illustrated
by studying the two types’ incentives under different policies. Under each pol-
icy P , the expected effort of a player is the weighted average of expected effort
of the h type and the l type, i.e., Eh(x) |P and El(x) |P , whose expressions are
given in the proof of Lemma 1.1 in Section A.4.




















Figure 1.1: Ranking of aggregate expected effort when vh = 2 and vl = 1.
P is
E(x) |P= 2(pEh(x) |P +(1− p)El(x) |P).
According to the analysis in the proof of Lemma 1.1, the expected effort
of the h type under the four different policies is ranked as follows:
Eh(x) |(C,C,C)> Eh(x) |(D,C,C)> Eh(x) |(D,D,D)> Eh(x) |(C,C,D) . (1.16)
Although there are two subcases for the equilibrium under the policy (C,C,D),
both cases yield the same comparison result: the expected effort of the h type
under the policy (C,C,D) is less than under the policy (D,D,D). Note that
this ranking of the h type’s expected effort is exactly the same as that of
aggregated expected effort. Figure 1.2 illustrates the ranking of the h type’s
expected effort while adopting a specification of vh = 2 and vl = 1.















Figure 1.2: Ranking of aggregate expected effort of the h type when vh = 2
and vl = 1.
across policies (C,C,C) and (D,C,C). Under (C,C,C), an h type’s belief is
to fight against an h type and an l type with the prior probabilities. Under
(D,C,C), an h type knows for sure which type he plays against, which allows
the h type to shirk when he faces an l type. In other words, the possibility
of competing in an even contest will induce the h type exerting more efforts.
This leads to lower average effort from the h type under policy (D,C,C).
We now move to the comparison of policies (D,C,C) and (D,D,D). Under
both policies, the h type knows the type of his opponent. The difference is
that under policy (D,C,C) the l type does not know the type of his opponent,
while under policy (D,D,D) the l type knows the type of his opponent. Under
policy (D,D,D), since the l type knows the type of his opponent when it is
an h type, the l type tends to be more withdrawn compared with the case in
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which he does not know the type of his opponent under policy(D,C,C). As
a result, an h type who faces an l type tends to exert less effort under policy
(D,D,D).
At last, we turn to the comparison between the policies (D,D,D) and
(C,C,D). Under policy (C,C,D), an h type does not know his opponent’s
type, but an l type knows exactly the type of his opponent, while under policy
(D,D,D) both an h and an l type are fully aware of their rival’s type. In
particular, under policy (D,D,D), the h type knows exactly that he is against
another h type (when the type profile is {h, h}), and thus he has the incentive
to exert comparatively higher efforts so as to win the prize, which yields the
higher expected efforts of the h type than that under policy (C,C,D).
Regarding the ranking of expected effort of the l type, we have El(x) |(D,D,D)
is the largest and El(x) |(C,C,C) is the smallest for any value of p ∈ (0, 1).
However, the two subcases of the equilibrium under policy (C,C,D) must be





. If p ≥ vl
vh
, we always have El(x) |(D,C,C)> El(x) |(C,C,D), and
the overall ranking is thus
El(x) |(D,D,D)> El(x) |(D,C,C)> El(x) |(C,C,D)= El(x) |(C,C,C) . (1.17)
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If p < vl
vh
, then we have
El(x) |(C,C,D) −El(x) |(D,C,C)= pvl(vh − vl)((1− p)vl − pvh)
2(1− p)vh(vh − (1− p)vl) ,
and the sign of the above difference is determined by (1−p)vl−pvh. Therefore,






, the ranking of expected effort of the l type is
El(x) |(D,D,D)> El(x) |(C,C,D)≥ El(x) |(D,C,C)> El(x) |(C,C,C) . (1.18)
If vl
vh+vl
< p < vl
vh
, then the overall ranking is
El(x) |(D,D,D)> El(x) |(D,C,C)> El(x) |(C,C,D)> El(x) |(C,C,C) . (1.19)
These comparison results can be illustrated as in Figure 1.3, which shows
the policy ranking in terms of the l type’s effort when vh = 2 and vl = 1.
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There are some interesting observations from the ranking results for the l
type by (1.17), (1.18) and (1.19). First, the full disclosure policy extracts the
highest equilibrium expected effort from the l type, and the full concealment
policy extracts the lowest expected effort from the l type, regardless of the
value of probability p. With the full disclosure policy, the l type knows whether
the opponent player is the h type or the l type, and also knows that the
opponent player would know his own type. While he is discouraged when his
opponent is an h type, he is well motivated when his opponent is an l type
15Notice that in this case the (D,C,C) policy and the (C,C,D) policy have an intersection
point when p = 13 , and the (C,C,D) policy overlaps with the (C,C,C) policy when p ≥ 12 .
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Figure 1.3: Ranking of aggregate expected effort of the l type when vh = 2
and vl = 1.
(i.e., in an even contest). In contrast, with the full concealment policy, the l
type faces the risk of competing against an h type, which tends to discourage
him from exerting costly effort. Furthermore, the h type does not know the
type of the opponent player in this case as well. He may exert an even higher
effort with the belief that the opponent player is another h type, which further
diminishes the incentive of the l type. As a result, the l type is reluctant to
exert much effort under the full concealment policy.
Second, the ranking of policies (D,C,C) and (C,C,D) depends on the
ranges of p. If p is sufficiently small (i.e., lower than vl
vh+vl
), an l type is to
compete with an l type with a high probability. Under the policy (C,C,D),
D happens for type profile {l, l}, and the l type is best motivated. Under the
policy (D,C,C), C happens for type profile {l, l}, so an l type is not sure
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which type of opponent he is facing, even though the chance is low that his
opponent is a high type. This uncertainty makes an l type more reluctant to
exert costly effort.
As p exceeds the critical value vl
vh+vl
, an l type is to compete with an h type
with a high probability. Under policy (C,C,D), C happens for type profile
{h, l}. The l type knows that he is against an h type when C happens; and
he knows that his h type opponent believes that he is playing against an h
type with a high probability, and thus would compete aggressively. With this
in mind, the l type tends to reduce his effort against the h type. Under the
policy (D,C,C), C happens for profile {h, l}. An l type is not sure which type
of opponent he is facing, though he understands that the chance is high that
his opponent is an h type who knows his l type. The h type opponent who
competes with an l type does not have to compete excessively aggressively,
which allows the l type to be more active.
It is clear that the ranking results of expected effort of the h type and l
type are quite different from each other. The ranking of aggregated expected
effort in Proposition 1.5, however, is dominantly determined by the ranking
of expected effort of the h type in (1.16). This observation is somewhat sur-
prising, given that it holds even when the probability p of the h type is close
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to zero.16 Intuitively, the h type with higher valuation must be more influen-
tial in determining the ranking of information disclosure policies in terms of
aggregate expected effort.17
1.5 Ranking Disclosure Policies by Players’ Pay-
offs
In this section, we consider ranking information disclosure policies by players’
expected payoff. For this purpose, we first calculate expected payoffs under
each policy.
1.5.1 Players’ Payoffs under Each Policy
Based on Propositions 1.1 to 1.4, direct calculations give the following results
in Lemma 1.2. We use pi|P to denote the expected payoffs for the players under
policy P .
Lemma 1.2. (i) Under policy (D,D,D), we have
pi |(D,D,D)= p(1− p)(vh − vl). (1.20)
(ii) Under policy (D,C,C), we have
pi |(D,C,C)= p(1− p)(vh − vl). (1.21)
16Note, however, that El(x) only differs a little across the policies for small p. Therefore,
these differences likely are dominated by those in Eh(x), even for small p.
17This can also be obtained from Figure 1.2 and 1.3, where the h type bids more than 12
in each disclosure policy, while the l type always bids lower than 12 .
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(iii) Under policy (C,C,D), we have
pi |(C,C,D)= p(vh − vl), if p < vl
vh
, and (1.22)
pi |(C,C,D)= p(1− p)vh, if p ≥ vl
vh
. (1.23)
(iv) Under policy (C,C,C), we have
pi |(C,C,C)= p(1− p)(vh − vl). (1.24)
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
1.5.2 Comparison and Explanation
Therefore, from equations (1.20), (1.21) and (1.24), we have pi |(D,D,D)= pi |(D,C,C)=




verify pi |(C,C,D)> p(1−p)(vh−vl) according to (1.22) and (1.23). These results
are summarized in Proposition 1.6.
Proposition 1.6. (Complete policy ranking by players’ expected pay-
offs) The policy (C,C,D) yields the highest expected payoffs for players. More-
over, the other three policies generate the same expected payoffs.
In addition, we are able to rank disclosure policies according to the expected
payoffs for the h type and the l type, separately. The ranking of disclosure
policies based on the h type’s expected payoff is exactly the same as that in
Proposition 1.6: The (C,C,D) policy yields the highest expected payoff for
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the h type, while the expected payoffs for the h type are the same under the
other three policies at the level of (1−p)(vh−vl). Interestingly, the l type has
a zero expected payoff under all four disclosure policies.
Proposition 1.6 shows that if the performance measure is players’ payoffs,
then allowing partial information disclosure policies would enhance the highest
expected payoffs, but it would not affect their lowest expected payoffs. Our
ranking of the policies based on players’ payoffs is consistent with the findings
of Morath and Mu¨nster (2008) and Fu et al. (2014), who find that full dis-
closure and full concealment generate the same expected payoffs for players in
all-pay auctions with a general number of players and continuous types.
It is not surprising that policy (C,C,D) yields the highest expected payoffs
for players, since Proposition 1.5 shows that this policy induces the least total
effort from contestants. Nevertheless, Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 reveal that in
general, it is not true that the policies that induce more effort would generate
lower payoffs. The reason is that the players’ payoffs also depend on allocative
efficiency, which we will study in the next section.
1.6 Ranking Disclosure Policies by Allocative
Efficiency
In this section, we study prize allocative efficiency under different disclosure
policies. Here, allocative efficiency is measured by the probability that the
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prize will be allocated to a bidder with high value.
1.6.1 Allocative Efficiency under Each Disclosure Pol-
icy
We use H to denote the case in which the prize is allocated to the h type,
and the probability of allocating the prize to the h type is denoted by Pr(H).
Based on Propositions 1.1 to 1.4, direct calculations give the following results
in Lemma 1.3.
Lemma 1.3. (i) Under policy (D,D,D), we have
Pr(H) |(D,D,D)= p ((2− p)vh − (1− p)vl)
vh
. (1.25)
(ii) Under policy (D,C,C), we have
Pr(H) |(D,C,C)= p ((2− p)vh − 2(1− p)vl)
vh − (1− p)vl . (1.26)
(iii) Under policy (C,C,D), we have
Pr(H) |(C,C,D)= p(2vh − vl)
vh




Pr(H) |(C,C,D)= 2p− p2, if p ≥ vl
vh
. (1.28)
(iv) Under policy (C,C,C), we have
Pr(H) |(C,C,C)= 2p− p2. (1.29)
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
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1.6.2 Comparison and Explanation
Note that in our setting, the comparison of allocative efficiency is completely
determined by the winning probability of the h type when type profile {h, l}
prevails.18 First, it is clear that a full concealment policy would generate the
most allocative efficiency, since the unique equilibrium is monotone.
Second, we show that an h type has the minimum winning chance when
facing an l type in a complete information game under the full disclosure policy.
By (1.25) and (1.26), we have
Pr(H) |(D,C,C) −Pr(H) |(D,D,D)= p(1− p)
2(vh − vl)vl
vh (vh − (1− p)vl) > 0.
Moreover, when p < vl
vh
, by (1.25) and (1.27) we have




and when p ≥ vl
vh
, by (1.25) and (1.28) we have
Pr(H) |(C,C,D) −Pr(H) |(D,D,D)= p(1− p)vl
vh
> 0.
Third, we compare (D,C,C) with (C,C,D). On the one hand, if p < vl
vh
,
by (1.26) and (1.27) we have
Pr(H) |(D,C,C) −Pr(H) |(C,C,D)= p((1− p)vl − pvh)(vh − vl)
vh(vh − (1− p)vl) .
18It is easy to see that the prize is definitely allocated to the h type when the type profile
is {h, h} and it is definitely allocated to the l type when the type profile is {l, l}.
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Notice that if p > vl
vh+vl
, we have Pr(H) |(D,C,C)< Pr(H) |(C,C,D), while if
p ≤ vl
vh+vl
, we have Pr(H) |(D,C,C)≥ Pr(H) |(C,C,D).
On the other hand, if p ≥ vl
vh
, by (1.26) and (1.28) we have
Pr(H) |(D,C,C) −Pr(H) |(C,C,D)= − p(1− p)pvl
vh − (1− p)vl < 0.
Last, we further refine the comparison between the full concealment policy
and the (C,C,D) policy. On the one hand, if p < vl
vh
, by (1.27) and (1.29) we
have
Pr(H) |(C,C,C) −Pr(H) |(C,C,D)= p(vl − pvh)
vh
> 0.
On the other hand, if p ≥ vl
vh
, by (1.28) and (1.29) we have
Pr(H) |(C,C,C) −Pr(H) |(C,C,D)= 0.
We summarize all these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.7. (Complete policy ranking by the efficiencies of al-
location) The full concealment policy induces the most allocative efficiency,
while the full disclosure policy induces the least allocative efficiency. When p
is sufficiently small (i.e., p ≤ vl
vh+vl
), then (D,C,C) induces more efficiency
than (C,C,D); when p is relatively big (i.e., p > vl
vh+vl
), then (C,C,D) in-
duces more efficiency than (D,C,C). Moreover, if p is sufficiently large (i.e.,
p > vl
vh
), then both the full concealment policy and (C,C,D) induce the same
level of efficiency.
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To illustrate our results in Proposition 1.7, Figure 1.4 exemplifies the rank-






















Figure 1.4: Ranking of the efficiencies of allocation when vh = 2 and vl = 1.
The results we obtained in Proposition 1.7 are quite intuitive. As men-
tioned previously, for any disclosure policy, the probability of allocating the
prize to the h type is always 1 when the realized type profile is {h, h}, and it
is always 0 when the realized type profile is {l, l}. Therefore, the policy com-
parison in terms of allocative efficiency is determined by the h type’s winning
probability when the type profile is {h, l}.
It is not at all surprising that the full concealment policy is the most
efficient, since the unique equilibrium induced is monotone. One can also
19Notice that in this case the (D,C,C) policy and the (C,C,D) policy have an intersection
point at p = 13 , and the curve for the (C,C,D) policy overlaps with that of the (C,C,C)
policy when p ≥ 12 . In addition, the ranking by allocative efficiency is opposite to the
ranking by the aggregate expected effort of the l type. If the l type exerts less effort, the h
type has a higher probability of winning.
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expect that the full disclosure policy will render the least efficiency, since
the complete information game induces the most noisy equilibrium in mixed
strategy, which gives the l type the best winning chance when {h, l} occurs.
Policy (C,C,D) is as efficient as the full concealment policy when p is
sufficiently large, since when {h, l} occurs, the l type simply gives up by bid-
ding zero under the (C,C,D) policy, as he expects that his h type opponent
would bid aggressively by anticipating competing with an h type with a high
probability, which yields the same winning probability of the h type as under
the full concealment policy. In addition, if p is relatively large (but not too
large), then for the case of the profile {h, l} under the (C,C,D) policy, the h
type is more willing to compete with another h type, and thus makes higher
effort compared to competing under the (D,C,C) policy, which implies that
the (C,C,D) policy induces more efficiency than the (D,C,C) policy. Last, if
p is sufficiently small, then when {h, l} occurs, the l type is better incentivized
to bid higher to win the prize under the (C,C,D) policy, because the h type
tends to bid less aggressively, in the belief that he will have many chances
against an l type. This lowers the winning probability of an h type under the
(C,C,D) policy and induces less efficiency than the (D,C,C) policy. Under
the (D,C,C) policy, if p is sufficiently small, the l type would be more inclined
to compare against another l type and makes higher effort. However, as the
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h type knows for certain that he is against an motivated l type in this case,
the h type has more incentive to exert greater effort to counteract this effect,
which increases his chance of winning the prize.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Optimal information disclosure has been well studied in the auction and con-
test literature. In this paper, we study a setting of a two-bidder all-pay auction
with discrete types, and provide complete rankings of four anonymous infor-
mation disclosure policies according to three different performance measures,
i.e., aggregate expected effort, players’ expected payoffs, and prize allocative
efficiency. The significant feature of our analysis is that we accommodate par-
tial information disclosure policies, which allow bidders to hold asymmetric
beliefs about the nature of various competitions. Our study reveals that dis-
closure policies are in general ranked quite differently according to different
performance measures. While the full concealment policy delivers the highest
total expected effort and the best allocative efficiency, the partial disclosure
policy—of disclosing players’ types if and only if both are low—induces the
lowest total expected effort, and the full disclosure policy renders the least
allocative efficiency. In terms of players’ expected payoffs, we find that players
enjoy the highest expected payoffs under the policy of disclosing types when
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both are low, and the other three policies render the same expected payoffs to
players. These rankings, therefore, provide guidance for the adoption of ap-
propriate information disclosure policies in contexts with different performance
goals or a combination of indicators.
In this paper, we focus on a setting of two players with two types. If there
are more than two players or two types, the structure of information disclosure
policies can be more complex, which means significantly more work to analyze
equilibrium strategies and comparisons. Another possible generalization of








Rank-order tournament schemes, in which players are rewarded based on rel-
ative performance, are widely adopted by firms and organizations as incentive
mechanisms to tackle moral hazard problem and to motivate workers to work
hard. The use of relative performance also affects promotion, salary increase
and bonus in many organizations, including governments and firms etc (e.g.
Baker et al., 1994; Eriksson, 1999; Carpenter et al., 2007; Franceschelli et al.,
2010; Tran and Zeckhauser, 2012).
However, these schemes also potentially provide workers incentives to sab-
otage their co-workers. Outputs and profits may be reduced when sabotage
is rampant. A real life example of the use of rank-order scheme is the ‘stack
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ranking’ scheme pioneered by GE in the 1980s and adopted by many large
corporations, such as IBM, Ford, Microsoft, and Motorola. According to Jue
(2012), about 49% of companies used some types of ‘stack ranking’ scheme
in 2009. Nevertheless, the share of companies who used such a scheme was
reduced to only 14% in 2011. In the Microsoft case, before 2013, employ-
ees were classified based on a 20-70-10 performance scale, whereby the top
20% performers would be generously rewarded, 70% others would be modestly
rewarded, and the bottom 10% would be classified as under-performers and
face significant risk of losing their job. The scheme notoriously created a cut-
throat competition where workers often resorted to politicking and aggressive
actions that are detrimental to the performance of their co-workers (Ovide,
2013). Eventually, bowing to the internal pressure, Steve Ballmer, the CEO
of Microsoft Corporation decided to abandon the ‘stack ranking’ system.
The prevalence of rank-order contests sparked tremendous interest in the
literature. The seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) established that a
rank-order contest with an optimally designed prize structure (i.e. pay dis-
persion) would achieve the first best outcome when workers cannot sabotage.
However, as in the example of the “stack ranking” scheme adopted by Mi-
crosoft, sabotage is often of a great concern when rewards are based on relative
performance. Lazear (1989) was one of the earliest researchers who empha-
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sized the existence of the incentives for sabotage activities at workplace. He
suggested that the pay dispersion should be lower in a rank-order contest with
sabotage than that in a contest without sabotage.
The trade-off between productive and sabotage efforts raises important is-
sues for equilibrium analysis and the optimal design of labor contests. In this
paper, we first carry out a complete equilibrium analysis with two players who
can be asymmetric in two dimensions (i.e. their marginal costs of both pro-
ductive and sabotage efforts) with interdependent effects between productive
and sabotage efforts. This asymmetric setting is motivated by the common
observation that costs of productive and sabotage efforts might differ even
among workers with similar observed characteristics, such as years of school-
ing or experience. The interdependent assumption is based on the belief that
a worker’s sabotage action is more destructive if his competitor puts more
productive effort in the production process. Since both workers can deviate si-
multaneously in two dimensions, the interdependence between these two types
of efforts makes the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium
a nontrivial issue. We show that this two-dimensional problem can be sim-
plified into a single dimensional problem that requires each worker to focus
only on his (her) effective input level, which is a composite of both productive
and sabotage efforts. The optimization problem essentially searches for the
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optimal combination of productive and sabotage efforts that would yield the
desired effective input level.1
We establish the existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy equilibrium for
any level of pay dispersion. The equilibrium analysis illustrates the necessary
and sufficient conditions for either positive or zero sabotage at the optimum,
and for achieving the first best outcome. This fills up the existing gap in
the work of Lazear (1989) on the existence of an equilibrium in contests with
sabotage when the strategy space is continuous and the effects of productive
and sabotage effort are interdependent. Our results show that the pay dis-
persion has two thresholds: ∆Vl and ∆Vh. When the level of pay dispersion
is (weakly) smaller than ∆Vl, in equilibrium neither worker sabotages. When
it is in between ∆Vl and ∆Vh, only the worker who is the most efficient in
sabotage would sabotage, and when it is bigger than ∆Vh, both workers would
1Arbatskaya and Mialon (2010) consider a similar model of multi-armed contests in
which players can influence their chances of winning through multiple activities or “arms”.
In their model, player i ∈ {1, 2} exerts effort xik ∈ R+ in activity k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} to
increase her chances of winning a prize, and player i’s effort with each arm in a K-armed
contest is represented by xi = (xi1, . . . , xiK). They axiomatize the contest success function
(CSF), pi(x1,x2) which is player i’s winning probability given both players’ effort (x1,x2),
and establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the K-armed contest by
transforming a multi-dimensional decision problem into a standard one-dimensional Tullock
contest. In particular, in one axiom for the CSF (Axiom 6), they assume that each player’s
probability of winning is zero when both players have zero effort in at least one arm; that is,
pi(x1,x2) = 0 if x1 ∈ RK+ \RK++ and x2 ∈ RK+ \RK++. However, this assumption does not hold
in our model: if both workers exert zero sabotage effort and (strictly) positive productive
effort, then their probabilities of winning are still positive instead of zero, and the sum
of winning probabilities is one. That is, the prize is awarded to the player with the higher
production in our model, even if neither player sabotages the opponent. Therefore, we adopt
another method different from Arbatskaya and Mialon (2010) to derive the equilibrium in
rank order contest with sabotage.
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sabotage. This result showing that workers do not always sabotage in the
equilibrium is consistent with Konrad (2000).
Next, we perform a comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium out-
comes. For this purpose, and in order to obtain explicit solutions for the
equilibrium productive and sabotage efforts, we partially relax the asymmetry
by assuming that workers have the same marginal cost of sabotage effort, while
still allowing the marginal cost of productive effort to be asymmetric.
We first evaluate the impact of changes in our model parameters on the
threshold value of pay dispersion that will induce sabotage. We show that
this threshold increases with the effectiveness of productive effort when the
marginal costs of productive effort of workers are unequal. However, when
they are equal, the threshold becomes independent of the effectiveness of pro-
ductive effort. The threshold decreases with the effectiveness of sabotage effort
and increases with the marginal costs of sabotage effort. In other words, for
a given level of pay dispersion, workers sabotage if only if they are either suf-
ficiently effective in sabotage or the sabotage cost is sufficiently low. When
they sabotage, the equilibrium sabotage efforts increase with the effectiveness
in sabotage and the size of the pay dispersion, but decrease with their marginal
cost of sabotage. The equilibrium productive effort takes the usual form as it
would be in the absence of sabotage, and its effectiveness does not affect the
44
equilibrium sabotage effort. This feature arises because the damage caused by
a worker’s sabotage effort is proportional to his competitor’s expected output.
The existence of a non-sabotage equilibrium suggests the possibility of
achieving the first best outcome even when workers can sabotage. It is achiev-
able if and only if the effectiveness of productive effort is higher than the
threshold which itself increases with the effectiveness of sabotage effort and
decreases with sabotage cost. The intuition of this is as follows. Since it is
relatively easier to motivate workers to work hard when productive effort is
more effective, the higher the effectiveness of their productive effort, the lower
the amount of reward needed to motivate workers to exert their first best pro-
ductive effort. Moreover, recall that the threshold level of pay dispersion does
not depend on the effectiveness of productive effort. Consequently, it is pos-
sible to find a reward that is large enough to induce the first best productive
efforts but small enough not to trigger sabotage if the productive effort is suffi-
ciently effective. In this case, the first best outcome is achievable as in Lazear
and Rosen (1981). Therefore, when productive effort is sufficiently effective,
introducing sabotage as an instrument in the contest does not always require
a reduction in the optimal pay dispersion as suggested by Lazear (1989), even
though we find that his claim still weakly holds.
Finally, we evaluate the optimal level of pay dispersion that will maximize
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the principal’s expected payoff. For tractability purpose, we focus our analysis
on a setting where workers are symmetric. In this case, the two thresholds of
pay dispersion is the same, i.e. ∆Vl = ∆Vh = ∆VS, and the equilibrium
involves either both workers sabotage or none of them sabotage. We show
that whenever the first best outcome is not achievable, profit-maximizing firms
have to balance between the impacts of sabotage effort and productive effort.
On the one hand, the optimal pay dispersion can never exceed the one that
induces the first best outcome. This is because a pay dispersion that is higher
than this level would induce less efficient productive effort and more sabotage
effort. This finding is consistent with Lazear (1989).
On the other hand, the optimal pay dispersion cannot be lower than the
threshold level of pay dispersion (∆VS), as doing so reduces workers’ produc-
tive effort but does not affect their sabotage effort. Whether it is optimal to set
the pay dispersion at ∆VS depends on the relative effectiveness of productive
effort compared to sabotage effort in enhancing a worker’s winning probability,
and on the marginal cost of sabotage. If sabotage effort is more effective than
productive effort, any increase in the pay dispersion beyond ∆VS will be detri-
mental: the damage caused by the increase in sabotage dominates the benefit
caused by the rise in productive effort. Hence, the optimal pay dispersion is
the threshold value, ∆VS. Nobody sabotages at the optimum. When sabotage
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effort is less effective than productive effort, ∆VS can also be the optimal pay
dispersion if the sabotage cost is high but not high enough for the first best
to be implementable. However, once the sabotage cost is low enough, then it
becomes optimal for the firm to set the pay dispersion higher than ∆VS, which
induces sabotage at the optimum. The intuition is as follows. ∆VS would be
rather small if the sabotage cost is very low. Eliminating sabotage means too
little productive effort would be induced. As marginal productivity could be
very high when productive effort is low, the gain from higher productive effort
outweighs the loss from higher sabotage effort when pay dispersion surpasses
∆VS.
Interestingly, we find that when sabotage does happen in the equilibrium,
neither the optimal pay dispersion nor the optimal pay compression (i.e. the
deviation of the optimal pay dispersion from its first best level) is monotonic in
the effectiveness of productive effort. In other words, the optimal pay disper-
sion and pay compression can be either higher or lower when the effectiveness
of productive effort increases. This non-monotonic relationship is due to the
interaction between the productive and sabotage effort described in the previ-
ous paragraph.
Our paper differs from the previous studies, with the exception of Konrad
(2000), in that it assumes that the effects of productive and sabotage effort
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are interdependent. While the setting is more realistic, the analysis is also
more demanding as the existence of equilibrium is less transparent. Method-
ologically, the novel contribution of our paper lies in the transformation of the
two-dimensional tournament problem into a single-dimensional problem, which
is essentially a Tullock rent-seeking contest and establishes the existence of a
unique pure-strategy equilibrium while allowing that workers are asymmetric
in their efficiency of both productive and sabotage effort. In comparison, based
on the assumption that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists,2 Lazear (1989)
shows that the optimal pay dispersion should be lower than the one that would
prevail in the absence of sabotage.3 Chen (2003), Chen (2005) and Mu¨nster
(2007) characterize the equilibria when the effects of productive and sabotage
effort are independent. Konrad (2000) establishes sufficient conditions for the
existence of zero sabotage equilibria when the effects of productive and sabo-
tage effort are interdependent. Our analysis complements Konrad (2000) by
further studying the cases where players engage in positive sabotage.
Since the post-transformation model is essentially a Tullock rent-seeking
model, it is worthwhile to note that the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium effort in such a model has long been established. Perez-Castrillo
2Lazear (1989) acknowledged that there is no guarantee that a unique interior solution
exists.
3We will refer this result as pay compression in later discussion.
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and Verdier (1992) derived the complete characterization of pure-strategy equi-
librium for symmetric Tullock contests, while Cornes and Hartley (2005) de-
rived that for assymetric Tullock contests, and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi
(1997) for Tullock contests with a general contest success-function. It is worth
mentioning that, while the equilibrium properties of Tullock contests where
the contestants only focus on a single-dimensional decision problem are well
known, little is known about a setting where contestants must make two de-
cisions simultaneously. To extend our understanding of the latter, our pa-
per shows that under a specific environment and functional form represent-
ing the inter dependencies between productive and sabotage effort, the two-
dimensional problem can be reduced into a single-dimensional problem that
allows us to analyze sabotage in a tractable manner.
It has been shown in a variety of contexts that incorporating sabotage
into rank-order contests generates significant impacts on the outcome of the
competitions (e.g. Kra¨kel, 2005; Amegashie and Runkel, 2007; Gu¨rtler, 2008;
Gu¨rtler and Mu¨nster, 2010; Ishida, 2012; Kra¨kel and Mu¨ller, 2012; Gu¨rtler
and Mu¨nster, 2013; Charness et al., 2014). Several recent empirical and ex-
perimental studies (e.g. Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011; Balafoutas et al.,
2012; Dato and Nieken, 2014) also confirmed the presence of the productive
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and counter-productive effects of larger performance based rewards.4 The
contemporary research regarding the effects of sabotage in different types of
competitions and contests are summarized in several survey articles, the most
recent ones being Amegashie (2015) and Chowdhury and Gu¨rtler (2015). It is
generally understood in the literature that a larger reward for the top perform-
ers provides workers stronger incentive to not only work harder but also exert
more effort to sabotage competitors. In this paper, we further reveal how the
existence of sabotage incentive shapes the optimal reward structure. In par-
ticular, our analysis illustrates how the equilibrium productive and sabotage
effort as well as the optimal rewards respond to the structural parameters of
the contest, including the effectiveness and the cost of both the productive
and sabotage effort.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the
model using the framework of two asymmetric workers. Section 3 carries out
the equilibrium analysis for any given pay dispersion, and in particular estab-
lishes the existence and uniqueness of the pure-strategy equilibrium. Some
comparative statics on equilibrium characterization is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 examines the optimal design of pay dispersion. Section 5 concludes.
4Gu¨rtler et al. (2013) also shows that the problem of reduction in productive effort due to
the risk of being sabotaged by competitors is solvable by concealing intermediate information
on the relative performance of workers.
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2.2 The Model
Following Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Lazear (1989), our analysis focuses
on a setting with one employer (the principal), and two workers (contestants
i and j). Total output, Q, is the sum of each worker’s output, i.e.
Q = qi + qj,
with
qi = f(xi) · φ(sj) · εi, (2.1)
where xi is the amount of productive effort of worker i, sj is the amount of
sabotage effort of worker j targeting worker i, and εi ∈ (0,+∞) is a random
component that is assumed to follow a Weibulll (minimum) distribution with
a c.d.f of F (εi) = 1− exp(−εi). The term “sabotage”is borrowed from Lazear
(1989), which can be any actions taken by a worker that adversely affect
another worker’s output. Neither the productive effort xi, nor the sabotage
effort si, is observable to the employer, and thus the employer will reward the
workers based on the output qi as these efforts are non-contractible.
It is natural to assume that functions f(·) and φ(·) have the following
properties:
f ≥ 0, f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0 and φ > 0, φ′ < 0, φ′′ > 0.
The assumption that i’s output is the product of f(xi) and φ(sj) implies
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that the damage inflicted by a worker’s sabotage depends on his competitor’s
productive effort. Holding sj constant, the damage increases with xi. For
tractability, we assume that f(xi) = x
r
i , and φ(si) = (1 + si)
−α, where the
parameter r ∈ (0, 1] measures the effectiveness of productive effort and α ∈
(0, 1) measures the effectiveness of sabotage effort.5 The production function





Moreover, the dis-utility of effort is described by cost function of worker i,
Ci(xi, si) = cixi + kisi,
where ci is the marginal cost of productive effort of worker i, and ki is the
marginal cost of sabotage effort. If the marginal cost of productive effort is
normalized to 1, then the relative cost of sabotage effort is interpreted as ki
ci
.
Under a rank–order contest payment scheme, the worker with the highest
output wins the first prize, Vw, and the other receives the second prize, Vl.
Given the production function (2.2), worker i’s probability of winning the first
5Lazear (1989) used a general form production function. The cost of doing so is that he
has to assume the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium.
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prize is





xri (1 + sj)
−α
xri (1 + sj)
−α + xrj(1 + si)−α
=
xri (1 + si)
α
xri (1 + si)
α + xrj(1 + sj)
α
.
We assume that workers are risk neutral. Therefore given the opponent’s
strategy (xj, sj), worker i chooses strategy (xi, si) to maximize
max
(xi,si)
EUi = pi(xi, si;xj, sj)(Vw − Vl) + Vl − Ci(xi, si).
Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that, when sabotage is not allowed, i.e.
si ≡ 0, ∀i, xi only depends on the pay dispersion ∆V , i.e. the difference
between these two prizes, denoted as
∆V = Vw − Vl.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In the model, the two players simultaneously choose their productive and sab-
otage efforts to maximize their payoffs. To solve the two dimensional globally
optimal problem, we first convert it to an equivalent single dimensional opti-
mization problem.
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2.3.1 The Equivalent Single-Dimensional Optimization






xri (1 + sj)
−α + xrj(1 + si)−α
∆V − (cjxj + kjsj). (2.3)
Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of first term of equation
(2.3) by (1 + si)
α(1 + sj)






xri (1 + si)
α + xrj(1 + sj)
α
∆V − (cjxj + kjsj).
Worker j’s winning probability is fully characterized by the value of xrj(1+sj)
α.
For the simplicity of notation, we denote
ej ≡ xrj(1 + sj)α.
The maximization problem can be solved in two stages. In the first stage,
we solve for worker j′s optimal choice of (xj, sj) that minimizes his cost Cj for
any given level of winning probability determined by ej. In the second stage,
given the optimal cost function C∗(ej) and the pay dispersion ∆V , we solve
for worker j′s choice of ej that maximizes his expected utility. Since only one
worker’s choice is analyzed, we drop the subscript j in the following discussion.
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Let us firstly consider the cost minimization problem,
min
x,s
C = cx+ ks (2.4)
s.t. xr(1 + s)α = e,
x ≥ 0, s ≥ 0.
Denote
z = (1 + s)α,
so we have x = (e/z)
1
r and s = z
1











α − 1) (2.5)
s.t. z ≥ 1.
We first solve the unrestricted minimization problem by ignoring the re-
striction z ≥ 1. The first order condition for the unrestricted minimization
















−1 = 0. (2.6)





























Because the second order derivative (2.7) is strictly positive if r ∈ (0, 1] and
α ∈ (0, 1), the objective function (2.5) is globally convex in z. Hence, the
unrestricted minimization has a unique solution.






































Since the objective function (2.5) is globally convex, the solution for the
restricted cost minimization problem can be written as
z∗ =
{
Φ if Φ ≥ 1,
1 if Φ < 1.
Let us define the cost function when z = 1 (i.e. s = 0) as
C∗R(e) = ce
1
r , ∀e ≥ 0.
Because C∗U(e) is the unrestricted cost function, and C
∗
R(e) is the restricted
one, C∗U(e) ≤ C∗R(e), ∀e ≥ 0. When Φ = 1, the solutions to both the unre-
stricted and the restricted minimization problems are z∗. Hence, C∗U(e) is
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It is easy to figure out that e ≤ ec ⇐⇒ Φ ≤ 1.





, we can write the minimum cost func-





















α+r − kj, if e > B,
cje
1
r , if e ∈ (0, B].
(2.9)














∆V − C∗j (ej). (2.11)
Because the functional form of C∗(e) depends on the value of e, the first
order conditions of the maximization problems (2.11) and (2.10) will also de-
pend on the value of e. Without loss of generality, let us solve worker j’s





























































































































j = 0. (2.12)






















j = 0. (2.14)
The solutions to the first order conditions of worker i and j are the equi-















solving the cost minimization problem (2.4). We may consider different results
of zero sabotage or positive sabotage in the equilibrium.
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2.3.2 Characterization of Equilibria




























∆Vl = min(ki, kj) · λ1, (2.17)
∆Vh = max(ki, kj) · λ2. (2.18)
We present the comparison between ∆Vl and ∆Vh in Lemma 2.1. The
proof is relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 2.1. (i) ∆Vl < ∆Vh when ki 6= kj; (ii) ∆Vl = ∆Vh when ki = kj.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Depending on the parameters, ci, cj, ki, kj, and the pay dispersion ∆V ,
the equilibrium outcomes could take one of the three forms: (1) if ∆V ≤ ∆Vl,
neither worker sabotages; (2) if ∆Vl < ∆V ≤ ∆Vh, only one worker sabotages;
and (3) if ∆V > ∆Vh, both workers sabotage. These three plausible outcomes
are established respectively in Propositions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
Case I (∆V ≤ ∆Vl): No Sabotage
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If the level of pay dispersion is relatively small such that ∆V ≤ ∆Vl, the
difference between winning and losing is less pronounce. A small reward softens
the competition between the two workers and makes sabotage not appealing
for them. The level of productive effort exerted is positively related to the
level of pay dispersion. The following proposition summarizes our result.
Proposition 2.1. A unique pure strategy equilibrium with zero sabotage exists
if and only if ∆V ≤ ∆Vl, in which the workers’ productive effort and sabotage
effort are













s∗j(∆V ) = 0. (2.22)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Case II (∆Vl < ∆V ≤ ∆Vh): Only One Worker Sabotages
Lemma 2.1 implies that if the marginal cost of sabotage differs between
these two workers, i.e. ki 6= kj, then ∆Vl 6= ∆Vh. Therefore, it is possible that
only one of them sabotages if ∆V is between these two thresholds. Without
loss of generality, let us assume that ki > kj. We can show that there always
exists an equilibrium such that only one worker sabotages regardless of whether
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ci ≥ cj or ci < cj,
Proposition 2.2. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if
∆V ∈ (∆Vl,∆Vh] , in which only the worker with the lowest sabotage cost sab-
otages. The equilibrium levels of both productive and sabotage effort, however,
cannot be explicitly solved.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Case III (∆V > ∆Vh): Both Workers Sabotage
Finally, when the level of pay dispersion is sufficiently large such that
∆V > ∆Vh, winning becomes significantly more attractive than losing, and
the competition between these two workers becomes more intense. As a result,
both workers would have stronger incentives to sabotage their opponent. The
equilibrium in this case would involve both workers sabotage each other. The
following proposition summarizes our result.
Proposition 2.3. There exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium with strictly
positive sabotage efforts for both workers if and only if ∆V > ∆Vh. The
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productive effort and sabotage effort are
























Proof. See Appendix B.4.
2.3.3 The Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we analyze how the equilibrium outcomes vary with the
structural parameters, such as r (the effectiveness of productive effort) and
α (the effectiveness of sabotage effort), and the marginal costs ci and cj of
productive effort. Since we cannot explicitly solve the equilibrium efforts level
if ki 6= kj i.e. ∆Vl 6= ∆Vh, in our comparative statics analysis, we focus on
the cases where workers have the same marginal cost of sabotage effort, i.e.
ki = kj = k. To have explicit solutions for s and x, we do not need to put
any restrictions on ci and cj. Focusing only on the case where ki = kj = k
is not as restrictive as it looks. By allowing the marginal cost of productive
efforts to differ between workers, we can still analyze the interaction between
heterogeneous workers by trading off between their productive and sabotage
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efforts.
Let us denote the common marginal cost of sabotage effort and threshold





















We will fix the pay dispersion, ∆V , throughout the comparative static anal-
ysis. Propositions 2.1 and 2.3 state that a higher ∆V would induce higher
productive and sabotage efforts, but ∆V does not affect ∆V c.
Changes in the Threshold ∆V c
Let us first investigate the impact of our model parameters on the threshold
value of ∆V c. For a given pay dispersion, ∆V , it is possible that a non-
sabotage equilibrium (Case 1) might shift to an equilibrium with sabotage
(Case 3) as ∆V c decreases, and vice versa. Proposition 2.4 summarizes the
results on the comparative statics on ∆V c.
Proposition 2.4. The following results regarding ∆V c holds.
(i) ∆V c increases with r when ci 6= cj, and is independent of r when ci = cj.
(ii) ∆V c decreases with α.
(iii) ∆V c increases with k.
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(iv) ∆V c increases with ci and decreases with cj when ci > cj, and any change
in ci or cj would increase ∆V
c when ci = cj.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
With a fixed ∆V , an increase in r (i.e. the effectiveness of the productive
effort) raises the threshold ∆V c if the marginal cost of productive effort differs
between these two workers (ci 6= cj). As a result, the range of the pay dispersion
∆V that leads to the zero sabotage equilibrium expands. Thus an equilibrium
where both workers sabotage might switch to an equilibrium where no-one
sabotages if ci 6= cj. The intuition for this result is that an increase in r
encourages workers to focus more on the productive effort than the sabotage
effort. If instead we have ci = cj, equation (2.27) shows that the variation in
r would not affect the threshold ∆V c.
The impacts of α, the effectiveness of sabotage effort, are opposite to those
of r. In particular, when α increases, the threshold ∆V c decreases. As α
increases, the range of the pay dispersion ∆V that produces the zero sabotage
equilibrium shrinks. Consequently, an equilibrium where neither sabotages
may switch to an equilibrium where both workers sabotage. Intuitively, an
increase in α induces workers to focus more on the sabotage effort rather than
on the productive effort.
The impacts of k, the marginal cost of sabotage effort, is similar to that of
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r. An increase in k enlarges the range of the pay dispersion that leads to zero
sabotage equilibrium. Hence, an equilibrium where both workers sabotage
might switch to an equilibrium where neither sabotages as k increases.
The comparative statics analysis with respect to ci and cj is more interest-
ing and less straighforward. If the two players initially have the same marginal
cost of productive effort, then any changes that destroy this symmetry would
expand the range of the pay dispersion where zero sabotage equilibrium exists.
A larger gap in the marginal cost of productive effort discourages sabotage.
Similarly, when the gap in the marginal cost of productive effort is initially
very big, a decrease in the gap lowers the threshold ∆V c and thus shrinks the
range of the pay dispersion where zero sabotage equilibrium exists. A narrow-
ing gap provides workers stronger motivations to sabotage each other. The
intuition for this can be explained as follows. When the difference between ci
and cj is sufficiently large, the low cost player would find it more beneficial to
increase the productive effort than to increase the sabotage effort in order to
win the contest. On the contrary, the high cost player would not be able to
increase his payoffs significantly even if he sabotages the low cost player.
Changes in the Equilibrium Productive and Sabotage Efforts
We turn our attention to the changes in the equilibrium productive and sabo-
tage effort in this subsection. We maintain the assumption where ki = kj = k,
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and thus focus on the equilibria in Propositions 2.1 and 2.3. In this case, the
optimal choices for x∗i and x
∗























The above two equations show that the productive efforts increases with r for
both workers when ci = cj.













2 − 1 if ∆V > ∆V c.
Hence, r does not affect their sabotage efforts when ci = cj. In what follows,
we would focus our comparative statics analysis on the case where ci 6= cj,
while keeping ki = kj = k.
The No Sabotage Equilibrium
If ∆V ≤ ∆V c, Proposition 2.1 states that the zero sabotage equilibrium
prevails (s∗i = s
∗
j = 0). In the following proposition, we analyze the impact
of changes in r, ci, and cj on the equilibrium productive and sabotage efforts.
We define the unique solution of equation 1 + x− (x− 1) ln(x) = 0 as cˆ, and




Proposition 2.5. In the equilibrium with zero sabotage, the following results
hold.
(i) Equilibrium productive efforts, x∗i and x
∗
j , does not depend on α and k.
(ii) There exists a cutoff cˆ ≈ 4.68 such that when max{ci,cj}
min{ci,cj} ≤ cˆ, both x∗i and
x∗j increase with r ∈ (0, 1]; and when max{ci,cj}min{ci,cj} ≥ cˆ, x∗i and x∗j increase




(iii) For the worker with the lower marginal cost of productive effort, his
productive effort decreases with his own marginal cost of productive effort
and increases with the other worker’s marginal cost of productive effort;
for the worker with the higher marginal cost of productive effort, his
productive effort decreases with both his own marginal cost of productive
effort and the other worker’s marginal cost of productive effort.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
Proposition 2.5 describes how productive effort changes with its marginal
cost and the contest technology in a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest
framework with no sabotage. In this setting, the worker with a lower marginal
cost of productive effort is the stronger player. Intuitively, the winning proba-
bility of the stronger (weaker) worker increases (decreases) with the gap in the
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marginal cost of productive efforts. To win the contest, the stronger player
does not need to put in as much effort if the gap increases. The weaker worker’s
winning probability, however, increases when the gap shrinks, which provides
him with a stronger incentive to put in more effort when his opponent gets
weaker.
The impact of changing r has been studied by Wang (2010) from a per-
spective of designing the optimal r∗ that would induce the highest total effort
in a Tullock contest without sabotage. Wang (2010) establishes that the total
effort is single-peaked at r∗, which optimally balances the asymmetry in the
workers’ productive costs. A larger ratio of
max{ci,cj}
min{ci,cj} implies that one worker
has a bigger comparative advantage in generating productive effort than the
other. A ratio
max{ci,cj}
min{ci,cj} that is higher than cˆ implies that the stronger worker’s
comparative advantage in productive effort is substantial. In this case, a lower
r∗(< 1) that renders the productive effort less effective is required to balance
the battle field. Both players’ effort is single peaked at r∗ as they are simply
proportional to the total effort. However, if
max{ci,cj}
min{ci,cj} < cˆ, that is when the
two workers are relatively homogeneous in productive effort, the optimal r∗
that strikes the optimal balance is greater than 1. We thus have both players’
productive effort increases in r ∈ (0, 1].
The Mutual Sabotage Equilibrium
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If ∆V > ∆V c, both workers sabotage in the equilibrium. Since equations
(2.28) and (2.29) hold for both ∆V ≤ ∆V c and ∆V > ∆V c, the comparative
statics of x∗i and x
∗
j are the same as in the zero sabotage equilibrium case, and









that the impacts of all the structural parameters on s∗ are reversed compared
to their impacts on ∆V c as having been discussed in Proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.6. In the equilibrium with mutual sabotage efforts, the follow-
ing results hold.
(i) The comparative statics of productive efforts, x∗i and x
∗
j , are the same as
in Proposition 2.5.
(ii) The equilibrium sabotage effort, s∗, increases with α, and decreases with
k.
(iii) s∗ decreases with r when ci 6= cj, and does not depend on r when ci = cj.
(iv) s∗ decreases with ‖ci − cj‖, i.e. the difference in the workers’ marginal
costs of their productive effort.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
Intuitively, the equilibrium sabotage effort increases with its effectiveness
and decreases with its marginal cost. Proposition 2.6 illustrates that the opti-
mal sabotage effort, s∗, decreases with the effectiveness of productive effort r
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when the marginal cost of the productive effort differs between workers. The
rationale behind this is as follows. At any given s, a worker can increase his
winning probability considerably by increasing his own x when r is big. To
counterbalance the increase in the impact of his opponent’s productive effort,
a worker raises his sabotage effort.
The comparative statics of the equilibrium sabotage effort s∗ with respect
to ci and cj is more subtle. If workers are symmetric in their marginal cost of
productive effort (ci = cj), then any changes that break this symmetry should
lead to a lower equilibrium sabotage effort. This implies that asymmetry in
the marginal cost of productive effort discourages sabotage. Similarly, when
workers are initially asymmetric in their marginal cost of productive effort,
then any changes in ci or cj that reduce the asymmetry encourages sabotage.
The intuition behind this is that when ci and cj are different, the stronger
player who has lower marginal cost of productive effort can respond by exert-
ing higher productive effort and lower sabotage effort to increase his winning
probability. In contrast, the weaker player who has higher marginal cost of
productive effort would not be able to increase his payoff significantly even
if he engages in sabotage effort. This observation is in line with our earlier
insight obtained from the comparative statics analysis of the threshold ∆V c.
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2.4 The Optimal Design of Pay Dispersion
In this section, we study the optimal design of pay dispersion ∆V that maxi-
mizes the principal’s expected payoff. To be consistent with Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and to facilitate comparison with their results, we assume in this sec-
tion that the two workers are symmetric and their marginal cost of productive
effort is normalized to 1, i.e. ci = cj = 1.
In the symmetric workers case, there exists only one threshold, ∆Vl =
∆Vh = ∆VS. As a result, in the equilibrium, either both workers sabotage or





The characterizations of these symmetric equilibria are illustrated in Corollary
2.1.
Corollary 2.1. When workers are symmetric, then






s∗(∆V ) = 0. (2.32)










∆V − 1. (2.34)
Proof. See Appendix B.8.
Corollary 2.1 states that for any given level of pay dispersion ∆V , there
always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. By adjusting the level of pay
dispersion, firms can induce their employees to exert an optimal level of sab-
otage effort, which might or might not be zero.
Since the principal can always extract the entire surplus by choosing a
losing prize such that a worker’s expected equilibrium payoff is zero. This
implies that a profit-maximizing firm chooses an optimal pay dispersion that
would maximize the social welfare.






j) as the strategy







j) = arg max
(xi,si,xj ,sj)
[E(qi + qj)− C(xi, si)− C(xj, sj)].
Because sabotage reduces the total output and is costly to the workers, the





Given the social optimal level of s∗i = s
∗
j = 0, the socially optimal choice of
(x∗i , x
∗
j) should equalize the marginal social benefit of productive effort to its













From (2.31) and given that c = 1, in order to induce workers to exert the
desired productive effort level, the employer needs to set the prize at 4r
r
1−r .
Let us define the critical value of ∆V on the first best allocation as
∆V FB = 4r
r
1−r .
Before proceed further, we first present Lemma 2.2 which we will use in
the analysis later on.
Lemma 2.2. (i) r
r




Proof. See Appendix B.9.
Lemma 2.2 implies that ∆V FB decreases with the effectiveness of produc-
tive effort, r.
We can now state Proposition 2.7.
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Proposition 2.7. If and only if ∆V FB ≤ ∆VS, i.e. k ≥ αr r1−r , the first best
allocation can be achieved through a symmetric rank-order contest. In this
case, the optimal prize is (∆V )∗ = ∆V FB.
Proof. According to Corollary 2.1 (i), if ∆V FB ≤ ∆VS, a rank-order contest
with ∆V = ∆V FB induces zero sabotage, and productive efforts are
xi = xj =
r
4
∆V FB = r
1
1−r ,
which is the first best allocation.
Proposition 2.7 states that the first best allocation is still a possible equi-
librium outcome even if sabotage can be used as an instrument when ∆V FB ≤
∆VS. Whether it is achievable or not depends on the effectiveness of produc-
tive effort r, the marginal cost of sabotage effort k, and the effectiveness of
the sabotage effort α.
Lemma 2.2 shows that r
r
1−r decreases with r, and hence Proposition 2.7
implies that given k and α, the chance of achieving the first best allocation
increases with r; and given r, the chance of achieving the first best allocation
increases with k but decreases with α.
If ∆V FB > ∆VS, the equilibrium is given by Corollary 2.1 (ii) and the
firm’s maximization problem can be written as
max
∆V
Epi = 2[x(∆V )]r[1 + s(∆V )]−α − 2[x(∆V ) + ks(∆V )]. (2.36)
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The first term of equation (2.37) reflects the positive impact of pay disper-
sion on the principal’s profit from rising productive effort. The second term
represents the negative impact of pay dispersion from rising sabotage effort.
The last term is the impact of the increased costs of productive and sabotage
effort when the productive and sabotage effort increase.
If α ≥ r, then dEpi
d∆V
< 0. In this case, the principal will set the optimal pay
dispersion ∆V ∗ = ∆VS. In equilibrium, workers do not sabotage their com-
petitors. If α < r, then the sign of dEpi
d∆V
depends on whether the positive effect
of rising productive effort is sufficiently large to compensate for the negative
effect of rising sabotage effort and the increased cost of both productive and
sabotage efforts. When α < r, dEpi
d∆V















Substituting equation (2.30) into inequality (2.38) yields







In this case, the optimal reward is ∆V ∗ = ∆VS = 4kα . At the optimum, there
will be no sabotage.
If k is sufficiently small, dEpi
d∆V
will be positive when ∆V = ∆VS. A firm
can increase its profit by increasing its pay dispersion ∆V . Hence, ∆VS is
not optimal anymore. As dEpi
d∆V
decreases with ∆V when α < r, there exists
another optimal ∆V ∗ > ∆VS such that dEpid∆V = 0. In this case, the optimal
prize is














which induces positive sabotage in equilibrium. It should be noted that ∆V ∗
is always smaller than ∆V FB. One can verify that when α < r and k < αr
r
1−r ,
































The above results on the optimal pay dispersion are summarized in Propo-
sition 2.8.




(i) If α ≥ r, the optimal pay dispersion is
∆V ∗ = ∆VS.
At the optimum, neither worker sabotages.
(ii) If α < r and k ≥ αr r1−r ( r−α
r+α
) 1
1−r , the optimal pay dispersion is
∆V ∗ = ∆VS.
At the optimum, neither worker sabotages.







1−r , the optimal pay dispersion is














At the optimum, both workers sabotage.
Proposition 2.8 states that if the first best outcome is not achievable, i.e.,
when marginal cost of sabotage effort is low (k < αr
r
1−r ), whether it is optimal
to tolerate some sabotage actions depends on the effectiveness of productive
and sabotage effort (r and α), and the marginal cost of sabotage effort k.
When α ≥ r, i.e., the worker’s sabotage effort is quite effective in reducing
his competitor’s output, the optimal pay dispersion is the threshold value
∆VS. As a result, nobody sabotages. The rationale behind this is that when
sabotage is very destructive, the firm will not tolerate any sabotage actions.
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When α < r, i.e., sabotage is not as effective, the total output always
increases with ∆V as the sum of the first two terms of equation (2.37) is
positive. However, whether it is profitable for the firm to increase ∆V depends
on the difference between the gain in output and the cost of the increase in
x and s. If the pay dispersion is set at ∆VS =
4k
α
, the first two terms of







, which decreases with k,
approaches to ∞ as k → 0 and approaches to 0 as k → ∞. Therefore, the
marginal gain in output from a small increase in ∆V beyond ∆VS approaches
to ∞ when k approaches 0. However, the marginal cost of rising x and s is
fixed at r+α
4
. Consequently, it is optimal to set a pay dispersion above ∆VS








implies that the marginal gain from output
increase will eventually be smaller than the marginal cost. Hence, once k is
large enough, it is optimal for the firm to set the pay dispersion at ∆VS.
Based on Propositions 2.7 and 2.8, we can investigate how the optimal pay
dispersion may depend on the structural parameters (k, α, r).
Corollary 2.2. The optimal pay dispersion ∆V ∗ increases with the marginal
cost of sabotage k if k < αr
r
1−r and does not depend on k otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.10.
Corollary 2.2 implies that the optimal pay compression (∆V FB − ∆V ∗)
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must weakly decrease with k as ∆V FB does not depend on k.
Corollary 2.3. The optimal pay dispersion ∆V ∗ decreases with α when α >
kr−
r
1−r and does not depend on α otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.11.
Corollary 2.3 implies that the optimal pay compression (∆V FB − ∆V ∗)
must increase with the effectiveness of sabotage effort, as ∆V FB does not
depend on k. Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3 show the monotonic relationships between
optimal pay dispersion and the effectiveness and the marginal cost of sabotage
effort, respectively. These results can help us to infer the effectiveness and
the cost of sabotage effort based on the observed pay dispersion of a firm.
For instance, the cost of sabotage is likely to be high or the effectiveness of
sabotage to be low if we observe a firm set a higher pay dispersion.
In Corollary 2.4, we will investigate the impact of effectiveness of productive
effort on the optimal pay dispersion and the optimal pay compression.
Corollary 2.4. The relationship between ∆V ∗ and r is non-monotonic.
Proof. See Appendix B.12.
Corollary 2.4 implies that a higher r does not necessarily imply a higher
optimal pay dispersion or lower equilibrium sabotage effort. Figure 2.1 illus-
trates the relationship between ∆V ∗ and r when k = 0.01 and α = 0.04. It
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shows that when rl < r < ru, ∆V
∗ firstly increases and then decreases with
r. This non-linear relationship also implies that the deviation from the first
best pay dispersion, (∆V FB −∆V ∗) could be non-monotonic in r. Figure 2.2
demonstrates this point.
Figure 2.1: The relationship between the optimal pay dispersion and r
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper complements Lazear and Rosen (1981), Lazear (1989), and Konrad
(2000) by providing a more complete account on equilibrium analysis, com-
parative statics and optimal design in a two-worker rank-order contest while
allowing asymmetry across workers and interdependent effects of their produc-
tive and sabotage effort. In the contest, workers can increase their winning
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Figure 2.2: The relationship between ∆V FB −∆V ∗ and r
probabilities either by sabotaging their competitors or by working harder. We
establish that there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium for any given
level of pay dispersion. Both workers would sabotage if the pay dispersion is
above an upper threshold and neither would sabotage if it is below a lower
threshold. If it lies in between, only the more sabotage efficient worker sabo-
tages. If and only if both workers share the same marginal cost of sabotage
effort, the two thresholds coincide.
The comparative statics is conducted for the case in which workers have the
same marginal cost of sabotage effort. Our analysis reveals that for a given pay
dispersion, the equilibrium sabotage activity increases with the effectiveness
of sabotage effort, and decreases with the effectiveness of productive effort,
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and the marginal cost of sabotage effort. More interestingly, we find that the
equilibrium sabotage activity increases with the gap between the two workers’
marginal costs of productive efforts. In other words, sabotage is more of a
concern when the workers’ efficiencies in their productivity are quite similar.
Based on the equilibrium relationship between the two types of efforts and
the pay dispersion, we analyze the selection of the optimal pay dispersion for
profit-maximization firms. For tractability, we assume workers are symmetric.
We first identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving the first
best outcome as described in Lazear and Rosen (1981). To satisfy these condi-
tions, sabotage activities must be less destructive or very costly. Under these
conditions, the wage compression suggested by Lazear (1989) is no longer re-
quired. If these conditions are violated, i.e. the first best is not implementable,
then the wage compression result must hold.
When the first best outcome is not achievable, for a given effectiveness of
productive effort, it is optimal for the firm to set an optimal pay dispersion
that induces positive sabotage if and only if sabotage is less effective and the
marginal cost of sabotage is rather small. Otherwise, the pay dispersion should
be set as high as possible without triggering any sabotage. Our analysis also
suggests that zero sabotage in an organization might not be an indication of
good management, as this can be a result of very effective sabotage activities.
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Similarly, observed sabotage activities might not necessarily be a sign of bad
management or poor organization performance, since positive sabotage can be
the optimal result of less destructive sabotage activities when the marginal
cost of sabotage is small.
A non-monotonic relationship is identified in general between the optimal
pay dispersion and the effectiveness of productive effort. Similar relationship
is also discovered between the optimal pay compression and the effectiveness of
productive effort. First, these results illustrate the complexities of determining
the direction in which the optimal pay dispersion should be adjusted when
the effectiveness of productive effort in an organization changes. Second, in
general, the observed high level of sabotage cannot be viewed as an indication
of more (or less) effective productive effort.
In this paper, we focused on a setting with two contestants. If there are
more than two contestants in the contest, the fact that each individual could
either make universal or individual-specific sabotages adds much complexity




Contests and Piece Rate
Contracts: The Case with
Sabotage
3.1 Introduction
In most sport competitions, such as the Olympic Games, prizes are awarded
not based on athletes’ absolute performance, but rather on their relative per-
formance rankings. Likewise, in many large corporations, providing sufficient
incentives for employees is a critical issue. Consider, for example, the pro-
motion of outstanding directors: If a firm’s management hierarchy remains
stationary, team leaders at any echelon have incentives to contend for a lim-
ited number of positions at a higher echelon in a rank order contest to acquire
more power and higher income. In contrast, another common reward scheme
is the standard (linear) piece rate contract, and its main advantage is that
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it is straightforward to design and easy to implement and enforce. Salesper-
sons, for instance, are awarded with salaries and bonuses based on absolute
performance, such as their working hours or accumulated revenues.
The relationship between reward schemes and incentives is an important
problem, and can be analyzed from different perspectives. It is a well-established
result that in the equilibrium of competitive labour markets with complete in-
formation, workers are optimally paid the monetary value of their marginal
product. This substantiates the widespread application of standard piece rate
rewards in many industries as the form of compensation, which directly gears
workers’ wages to output. However, a worker’s effort may not be perfectly re-
flected in his output if there are common productive shocks (such as low quality
of management or inappropriate usage of machinery) or idiosyncratic shocks
(such as differentiated personal working environments), and the costly mon-
itoring of workers’ effort is another practical issue for employers. Therefore,
the rank order payment scheme prevalent in many labour contracts operates
under circumstances in which workers’ effort is not perfectly observed. This
reward scheme allocates different prizes to workers according to their relative
rankings in various labour contests, and salaries are not, therefore, directly
related to actual output levels, since prizes are provided and fixed in advance.
In a rank order contest, performance incentives are induced by attempts to
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outperform competitors and win the contest. Hence, it conforms to common
intuitions that if reliable and cost-efficient measurements of effort are achiev-
able, then the optimal reward is to pay piece rate wages1 based on observed
effort level. On the other hand, when the monitoring of effort by employers is
technically difficult and/or expensive, the alternative payment scheme of rank
order contest based on relative performance2 is potentially a better choice to
elicit adequate incentives from workers. Nevertheless, it is critical to investi-
gate the conditions under which the rank order contest is superior to the piece
rate contract from the employer’s perspective.
In this research paper, we aim to compare and contrast two reward schemes,
the rank order contest (relative performance evaluation) and the piece rate
contract (absolute performance evaluation) within the framework of principal-
agent problems. We consider a model in which a principal employs two work-
ers for production, and the principal provides compensations based on their
output, since their efforts are nonobservable and thus, noncontractable. In
particular, the two workers are able to compete with each other in two dimen-
sions by making productive effort or sabotage effort targeting the rival. The
concept of sabotage is characterized in diverse ways in economics literature.
1For an analysis of piece rate contracts, see Lazear (1986), Gibbons (1987), and Neilson
and Stowe (2010).
2For a study of competitive compensation schemes of rank order contests, see Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983), Meyer and Vickers (1997), and Liu et al. (2016).
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In the field of industrial organization, Salop and Scheffman (1983) consider
sabotage in terms of the act of “raising rival’s cost.” In the context of labour
economics, Lazear (1989) defines sabotage as “any actions that one worker
takes that adversely affect the output of another.” From the perspective of
contests, Chowdhury and Gu¨rtler (2015) describe sabotage as “a deliberate
and costly act by one contestant to damage the performance of another.” Re-
views of economic research on the means and consequences of sabotage include,
but are not limited to, Konrad (2009), Amegashie (2015), Dechenaux et al.
(2015), and Chowdhury and Gu¨rtler (2015). More specifically, in our model,
one worker’s productive effort directly increases his own production (with-
out any influence on the opponent worker), while his sabotage effort does not
contribute to the production, but would have a negative consequence for the
opponent worker’s output.
The compensations provided in the two reward schemes are different. On
the one hand, in the rank order contest the principal establishes ex ante two
prizes for the two workers, i.e., the top prize and the second prize, to incen-
tivize higher production, and hence the purpose is to design the optimal prize
structure. As in the analysis of Liu et al. (2016), the most crucial factor is
the pay dispersion between the two prizes. Generally, as the pay dispersion
increases, the workers are inclined to make higher productive effort as they
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aim to win the top prize. If the pay dispersion is sufficiently large and exceeds
a critical level, however, they will also exert positive sabotage effort in equilib-
rium in order to obtain an advantage in the relative ranking. Following Liu et
al.’s approach, without loss of generality we consider the positive top prize and
normalize the second prize as zero in the rank order contest, so that the pay
dispersion is directly represented by the value of the top prize. In contrast,
with the piece rate contract the principal does not rely on the relative ranking
between the two worker’s production, but instead provides a symmetric and
unbiased reward per unit of output for both workers.3 Therefore, the higher a
worker’s output, the higher reward he can directly receive from the principal.
For analysis of the rank order contest, it is shown that two symmetric
workers will make positive sabotage effort if and only if the top prize is beyond
a threshold level. To make this comparable to the piece rate contract, the
principal has the flexibility to set up an entry fee for both workers in order
to extract the total surplus from the two workers in the rank order contest.
Following this approach, we obtain results for the optimal top prize in the
rank order contest. First, if the unit price is very small, the optimal top prize
is established such that neither worker makes sabotage effort in equilibrium.
3An intuitive result is that since the relative performance ranking is irrelevant in de-
termining the rewards in the piece rate contract, neither worker has the incentive to make
positive sabotage effort, which is costly but does not contribute to boost the output. This
will be verified in the subsequent analysis.
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Second, if (1) the productive effort is less effective than the sabotage effort
and the unit price is large or (2) the productive effort is more effective than
the sabotage effort and the unit price is in the intermediate range, the optimal
top prize will be at the threshold level to elicit as much productive effort as
possible from the workers. Third, if the productive effort is more effective than
the sabotage effort and the unit price is sufficiently high, the optimal top prize
is established such that total production is increased; also, the two workers
make positive sabotage effort toward each other in equilibrium.
The optimal piece rate reward is also determined for the piece rate con-
tract. We demonstrate that neither worker has the incentive to sabotage the
opponent under the piece rate contract, and hence the compensation provided
by the principal serves to induce only workers exerting productive effort. The
optimal piece rate reward therefore hinges on the unit price and the effective-
ness of productive effort, and is not related to the effectiveness of sabotage
effort.
Based on these optimality results, the maximum expected profits for the
principal in the optimal rank order contest and the optimal piece rate contract
are pinned down for the different ranges of unit prices, which also depend on
the values of structural parameters, such as the effectiveness of productive
effort and sabotage effort. We can thus compare the two reward schemes
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according to the corresponding maximum expected profits in individual cases.
Generally, with respect to the optimality results of the rank order contest,
we determine two threshold values to divide the unit price into three ranges:
low, intermediate, and high. In the low range of unit price, the optimal rank
order contest renders a higher maximum expected profit for the principal than
the piece rate contract. Nonetheless, in the intermediate or high range, the
existence and uniqueness of the critical value of the unit price (dependent uon
the effectiveness of productive and sabotage effort) is demonstrated, which
changes the superiority of the two reward schemes. If the unit price is below
the critical value in either of the two ranges, the maximum expected profit
from the rank order contest is larger; if the unit price is greater than the
critical value, the maximum expected profit from the piece rate contract is
larger.
Therefore, through examination of optimal rank order contest and optimal
piece rate contract in different ranges of unit prices, we obtain a succinct result
for the comparison of the two reward schemes. For any structural parameters
of the effectiveness of productive and sabotage effort, we can always identify a
corresponding critical value of the unit price. If the unit price is less than the
critical price, the optimal rank order contest is superior to the optimal piece
rate contract, as the maximum expected profit from the former is higher.
90
Conversely, if the unit price is greater than the critical price, the optimal piece
rate contract renders a higher maximum expected profit and is thus more
attractive from the principal’s perspective.
Lazear and Rosen (1981) pioneered research on the comparison between
rank order contests and piece rate contracts. They analyze, among some other
questions, the design of a labour contract for a risk-neutral principal with two
workers in which the output of each worker is stochastically determined by his
own level of investment (effort) and an additively Independent and identically
distributed common productive shock. Workers choose their effort levels prior
to observing the value of the common shock. Lazear and Rosen consider
three compensation schemes: (1) linear piece rates, under which each worker’s
compensation is a linear function of his output; (2) rank order tournaments,
under which the two workers compete against each other for two fixed prizes,
which are allocated on the basis of ranked output levels; and (3) comparisons
against a fixed standard, under which one higher payment is awarded if a
worker’s output is above the standard and one lower payment is awarded if it
falls anywhere below the standard. The benchmark result is that if the workers
are risk neutral, all three compensation schemes, assuming free entry and zero-
profit conditions in competitive markets, achieve the same efficient allocation
of resources and lead to the same expected rewards to the workers. In addition,
91
they show, through a series of numerical examples, that if the workers are risk
averse, the relative comparison of the three schemes depends on the variance of
common shocks and the parameters of workers’ utility functions (for example,
the measurement of absolute risk aversion).
Moreover, Green and Stokey (1983) deliberate on a model with one risk-
neutral principal employing multiple ex ante identical risk-averse agents. They
consider both independent contracts, which compensate an agent based on his
output, and labour tournaments, which distribute multiple prizes according
to the rank order of output. The realized output of any agent consists of a
stochastic production of his effort and an additive shock term common to all
agents, and the utility function of an agent is additively separable as the com-
bination of a concave function of his income and a linear function of his effort.
Green and Stokey show that in the absence of a common shock, the optimal
independent contracts dominate using the optimal tournaments. In contrast,
given any group of at least two agents, if the distribution of common shock is
sufficiently diffuse, the optimal tournament dominates using the optimal inde-
pendent contracts. The dominance of optimal tournaments over independent
contracts still holds for a sufficiently large number of agents, assuming any
fixed distribution of the common shock term.4
4Note that in Green and Stokey’s (1983) model, there also exist idiosyncratic shocks
among the agents, since an agent’s output is stochastic conditional on the effort level.
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In addition, regarding the analysis of different types of contracts there are
two categories of models in contest literature on the productive function of
players, the additive model and the multiplicative model. On the one hand,
in the additive model it posits that a player’s output is determined as the
sum of his productive effort, his ability, a common shock term (affecting all
players in contest) and an idiosyncratic shock term which is assumed indepen-
dent or correlated among players. On the other hand, in the multiplicative
model a player’s output is pinned down as the product of these four inputs.
For example, Lazear and Rosen (1981), Knoeber and Thurman (1994) and
Levy and Vukina (2004) focused on the framework of additive model, and
Shleifer (1985) and Zheng and Vukina (2007) adopted the setting of mul-
tiplicative model. Furthermore, through a controlled experimental analysis
under different “incentive systems” including cardinal, ordinal and piece rate
tournaments, Hammond and Zheng (2013) aim to distinguish the additive
and multiplicative models in the approach of investigating the relationship
between effort provision and tournament heterogeneity. More specifically, un-
der the same condition that heterogeneity increases in the ordinal and piece
rate tournaments, a player’s effort will change if the multiplicative model is
assumed, while the additive model predicts that effort does not change. Their
experimental results support the additive model, which implies that “ability
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and effort are neither complements nor substitutes in tournaments”. Besides,
Holmstro¨m (1982) consider both additive and multiplicative models for the
study of relative performance evaluation. In this research paper, we do not
make assumptions on players’ abilities, while instead both the productive and
sabotage effort are included in the production. Additionally, the multiplicative
model is adopted to formalize the idea that the marginal detrimental effect of
a player’s sabotage effort is positively related to the opponent’s productive
effort.
Tournaments and piece rate contracts in labour markets have also been
compared when liquidity constraints are imposed on either the principal or
the agents, so that the tradeoff between insurance against common shock
and incentive elicitation must be balanced. In general, without any liquid-
ity considerations, if agents are risk averse and there is a sufficiently large
common shock in the production, it is demonstrated that the competitive
tournament is a superior incentive scheme to the piece rate contract. This
is because the principal is able to offer insurance to participating agents by
filtering out the common shock through information generated by the per-
formance of agents in the tournament. Conversely, when agents are liquidity
constrained, such that the transfer to them cannot fall below a predetermined
minimum payment, Marinakis and Tsoulouhas (2012) explore the comparison
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between cardinal tournaments5 and piece rate contracts. They show that in
the presence of common shock6, the optimal tournament is still preferred by
the principal (employing risk-averse agents) to the optimal piece rate contract,
even when agents are liquidity constrained. This is because, in the optimal
tournament, payments to the agents in unfavorable states increase and pay-
ments in favorable states decrease to satisfy liquidity constraints for agents
and this provides higher-power incentives than under piece rate contracts. In
addition, Marinakis and Tsoulouhas (2013) further analyze the comparison
of the two compensation schemes under the condition that a limited liability
(or bankruptcy) constraint restricts the principal’s ability to make payments.
The limited liability imposed on the principal implies that the base payment
in a tournament or a piece rate scheme cannot exceed the liquidation value
of the firm; otherwise, the firm would go bankrupt. Therefore, the issue of
the superiority of optimal tournaments over piece rate contracts is subject to
the ranges of liquidation value. Marinakis and Tsoulouhas (2013) first demon-
strate that in the absence of limited liability, optimal tournaments dominate
5Under a cardinal tournament, compensation to each agent includes a fixed part (base
payment) and a variable part (bonus based on relative performance against the average
output by all agents). Thus, the sum of prizes is ex ante fixed, but each agent’s ex post
share depends on the relative performance evaluation.
6In Marinakis and Tsoulouhas’ (2012) model, the production of an agent depends on his
known ability and his effort, as well as a common shock and an idiosyncratic shock. The
base payment and bonus payment in optimal tournaments thus depend on the distributions
of both common shock and idiosyncratic shock.
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optimal piece rate contracts if the common shock is larger than a fraction of
the idiosyncratic shock. In contrast, optimal tournaments are dominated by
optimal piece rate contracts when the principal is subject to limited liability
and the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small. Alternatively, if the
liquidation value is larger than the critical value, which is related to the distri-
butions of common and idiosyncratic shock, optimal tournaments are superior
to piece rate schemes.
Besides theoretical analysis of rank order tournaments and piece rate con-
tracts, several literatures present the results of experimental research on the
comparison of these reward schemes. In a study employing more than two
hundred student volunteers, Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987) examine the
predictions of incentive theory on tournaments and piece rate contracts with
experimental evidence, and show that although there is large variance in be-
havior across identical tournaments, the mean effort levels chosen by subjects
converge to the theoretical equilibrium levels in both piece rate contracts and
(symmetric) tournament experiments. Furthermore, they demonstrate that
one cost to the principal of choosing a tournament over a piece rate scheme
is that the principal must take into account the higher uncertainty of agents’
systematic average behavior (i.e., larger variance in exerted effort levels), as
reflected in tournament experiments. In addition, Wu and Roe (2005) com-
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pare the welfare effects of tournaments and fixed performance standard con-
tracts (FPSCs), which is relevant to the regulation of agricultural production
contracts in US. Through several experiments with forty-eight subjects, they
show that agent welfare is generally higher under fixed performance contracts,
which are thus preferred by the agents, but the welfare advantage of fixed per-
formance contracts diminishes as the relative size of the standard deviation of
common shock increases. Another finding of Wu and Roe is that agents tend
to exert higher effort, on average, under fixed performance contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model’s set up.
Analyses of optimality in the rank order contest and piece rate contract are
demonstrated in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, the two reward
schemes are compared on the basis of maximum expected profits in different
ranges of unit price. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
3.2 The Model
Consider a production process with one employer (the principal) and two work-
ers (i = 1, 2). The total output Q is the sum of each individual worker’s
output,
Q = qi + qj.
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The output of worker i, represented by qi, is determined by
qi = f(xi) · φ(sj) · εi,
where xi is the productive effort exerted by worker i, sj is the sabotage ef-
fort exerted by worker j targeting worker i, and εi ∈ (0,+∞) is the random
productive shock following a Weibull (minimum) distribution with a CDF of
F (εi) = 1− exp(−εi). The concept of “sabotage” in the model was originated
by Lazear (1989), and refers to any behavior taken by a worker that has a
detrimental effect on the opponent’s output. Moreover, the unit price of the
output from production is assumed to be p, which is considered to be con-
stant and not affected by the production level (e.g., in a perfectly competitive
market).
The functions f(·) and φ(·) are assumed to have the following properties:
f(·) ≥ 0, f ′(·) > 0, f ′′(·) < 0,
φ(·) > 0, φ′ < 0, φ′′(·) > 0.
These assumptions show that although the marginal effect of productive effort
is positive and the marginal effect of (opponent worker’s) sabotage effort is
negative, both of the marginal effects are diminishing with respect to the
corresponding efforts exerted.
The multiplicative (instead of the additive) form of f(xi) and φ(sj) demon-
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strates that the counterproductive effect induced by a worker’s sabotage effort
depends on his opponent’s productive effort. More specifically, we assume that
f(x) = xr and φ(s) = (1 + s)−α, which shows that the effectiveness of produc-
tive effort is measured by r ∈ (0, 1), and the effectiveness of sabotage effort
(by the rival worker) is measured by α ∈ (0, 1).





With the effort choices of (xi, si), worker i encounters the cost Ci described
by the following function:
Ci(xi, si) = cixi + kisi,
where ci and ki are the marginal cost of worker i’s productive effort and sab-
otage effort, respectively.7 It is further assumed that both workers are risk
neutral, so they aim to maximize the expected reward minus the cost associ-
ated with the exerted efforts.
For model tractability, we consider symmetric workers with homogeneous
costs in the subsequent parts. The marginal costs of productive efforts and
sabotage efforts are normalized as ki = ci = 1 for i = 1, 2, and the structural
parameters include r and α. Therefore, the effort cost function of worker i
7By normalizing the marginal cost of sabotage effort as 1, we may also consider the
relative cost of productive effort as ci.
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becomes
C(xi, si) = xi + si. (3.2)
3.3 Analysis of rank order contest
Regarding the rank order contest with sabotage, Liu et al. (2016) demon-
strate that the principal can induce the no-sabotage equilibrium or the mutual-
sabotage equilibrium with the pay dispersion ∆V = Vw−Vl as the instrument.
Moreover, since positive sabotage efforts not only decrease workers’ produc-
tions, but also increase the total cost of workers, the first-best production level
is established by equating the social marginal benefit of productive efforts with
the social marginal cost while setting the sabotage effort of both workers as
zero. Consequently, it is straightforward to deduce that the no-sabotage equi-
librium in the competitive scheme of rank order contests dominates any other
equilibrium in terms of expected total production.
Following the framework of Liu et al. (2016), without loss of generality, we
can normalize the second prize as 0 and denote the top prize as V , so the prize
structure can be written as (Vw, Vl) = (V, 0) and the prize dispersion is simply
∆V = V . With the assumption of ki = ci = 1 in the symmetric-worker model,
the problem of worker i is to maximize the expected utility in the rank order
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contest by choosing the efforts (xi, si), given the opponent’s choices (xj, sj):
max
(xi,si)
EUi =pi(xi, si;xj, sj) · V − C(xi, si)
=
xri (1 + si)
α
xri (1 + si)
α + xrj(1 + sj)
α
· V − (xi + si).
By simplifying the two-dimensional maximization problem to the single-
dimensional maximization problem with prize structure (V, 0), we denote the
threshold level of the top prize (in the model of symmetric workers) as




















Therefore, for the different ranges of the top prize V , the equilibria of the
rank order contest with sabotage are summarized in Proposition 3.1, which is
derived from Propositions 1 and 3 in Liu et al. (2016).
Proposition 3.1. If workers are symmetric with the homogeneous costs ki =
ci = 1 (i = 1, 2), the following results hold.
(i) There exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium with zero sabotage effort





s∗(V ) =0. (3.4)
(ii) There exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium with strictly positive sab-











Proof. Please refer to the proofs in Liu et al. (2016).
As the equilibria of the rank order contest are presented in Proposition
3.1, we can further study the problem of profit maximization with respect to
different types of equilibria.
3.3.1 Maximizing expected payoff
In this part, we consider the optimal design of the top prize that maximizes
the principal’s expected payoff. With the assumption of ki = ci = 1, we can






j ) as the strategy profile







j ) = arg max
(xi,si,xj ,sj)
(E(qi + qj)− C(xi, si)− C(xj, sj))
= arg max
(xi,si,xj ,sj)
(E(qi + qj)− (xi + si)− (xj + sj)) . (3.7)
The social welfare is maximized only at sFBi = s
FB
j = 0, since any positive
sabotage efforts would reduce total output and are costly to workers. The
first best optimal choice of (xFBi , x
FB
i ) is determined when the marginal social
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As the first best allocation corresponds to the equilibrium with zero sabo-
tage effort, the top prize needs to be set at 4r
r
1−r , according to equation (3.3)





), to induce workers to exert the desired first best pro-
ductive efforts. Let us define the critical level of the top prize on the first best
allocation as
V FB = 4r
r
1−r . (3.9)
If V FB ≤ VS, then the first best allocation is feasible in the rank order
contest. The optimal choice of the top prize regarding the first best allocation
is thus stated in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. For symmetric workers with ki = ci = 1 (i = 1, 2), if and
only if V FB ≤ VS = 4α , i.e., αr
r
1−r ≤ 1, the first best allocation can be achieved
through a rank order contest. In this case, the optimal top prize is
V ∗ = V FB = 4r
r
1−r .
Proof. Please refer to the proofs in Liu et al. (2016).
In contrast, if V FB > VS, then the first best allocation is not achievable in
the rank order contest with sabotage. The optimal choice of top prize depends
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on the different ranges of structural parameters r and α and is presented in
Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3. For symmetric workers with ki = ci = 1 (i = 1, 2), suppose
V FB > VS, i.e., αr
r
1−r > 1.
(i) If α ≥ r, then the optimal top prize is




At the optimum, neither worker sabotages.







1−r ≤ 1, then the optimal top prize is




At the optimum, neither worker sabotages.







1−r > 1, then the optimal top prize is













∈ (VS, V FB).
At the optimum, both workers sabotage.
Proof. Please refer to the proofs in Liu et al. (2016).
3.3.2 Maximizing expected profit
In this part, we consider the optimal design of the prize structure that maxi-
mizes the principal’s expected profit, with the assumption that the unit price
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of the output is p > 0. In addition, to extract the total surplus from two
symmetric workers, the principal needs to levy an entry fee y on each worker.
The expected profit of the principal is calculated as follows. Upon an-
nouncement of the top prize V established by the principal, the two workers
choose their optimal productive and sabotage efforts, as presented in either
the no-sabotage equilibrium (as in Proposition 3.1(i)) or the mutual-sabotage
equilibrium (as in Proposition 3.1(ii)), which are denoted as x∗(V ) and s∗(V ),
respectively. In the rank order contest, the winning worker with a higher pro-
duction level receives the prize of V and the other worker receives zero prize.
Hence, if the top prize is V , then the total surplus S(V ) of the two workers is
S(V ) =(V + 0)− 2(x∗(V ) + s∗(V )).
So the entry fees (collected by the principal) are set strategically to extract
the total surplus such that 2y = V − 2(x∗(V ) + s∗(V )).
Therefore, in the rank order contest with sabotage, by setting the prize
structure as (V, 0), the principal collects the entry fees, obtains the aggregate
output from the two workers (with the unit price p), and awards the prize V
to the winner. The principal’s expected profit from the rank order contest is
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thus
piRO =p(E(qi) + E(qj)) + 2y − V
=2p(x∗(V ))r(1 + s∗(V ))−αE(εi) + V − 2(x∗(V ) + s∗(V ))− V
=2p(x∗(V ))r(1 + s∗(V ))−α − 2(x∗(V ) + s∗(V )). (3.10)
The threshold level of the prize to differentiate the no-sabotage and mutual-
sabotage equilibria is VS =
4
α
. As the optimal efforts of x∗(V ) and s∗(V )
are different for V ≤ VS and V > VS according to Proposition 3.1, we can
substitute the corresponding solutions (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) into the




























We first consider the cases of V ≤ 4
α
and V > 4
α
separately to determine
the profit-maximizing point on each interval.
For V ≤ 4
α











V1 ≡ 4p 11−r r r1−r .
The second order condition is
d2piRO
dV 2




V r−2 < 0,
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since the parameter r ∈ (0, 1). Hence, it is a maximizing point at V = V1.




1−r ≤ VS, we can have p ≤ r−rαr−1. So for the range
of V ≤ 4
α
, if p ≤ r−rαr−1, then the maximizer is V = V1, and if p ≥ r−rαr−1,
then the maximizer is V = VS.
The result of expected profit maximization for p ≤ r−rαr−1 is presented in
Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4. For the model of symmetric workers with ki = ci = 1
(i = 1, 2), if p ≤ r−rαr−1, then the optimal top prize is










1−r (1− r). (3.14)
The intuition for Proposition 3.4 is that when the unit price of output is
quite small, it is optimal for the principal to establish the first prize in (3.13)
such that the interior maximizing point is achieved in equilibrium. Since the
unit price is small and so is the profit margin, the relatively low top prize
prevents any worker from exerting sabotage effort, which is costly and wasteful.
For V > 4
α
























+α−rprrα−α(r − α)(r − α− 1)V r−α−2.
We thus need to discuss three cases.
(i) If r ≤ α, then dpiRO
dV
< 0 for any value of V > 4
α
based on equation (3.15).














(ii) If r > α, then dpiRO
dV
= 0 at V = V2, and
d2piRO
dV 2
< 0 for any V > 4
α
.
Moreover, if V2 ≤ 4α (i.e., p ≤ r−rαr−1 r+αr−α), then piRO is maximized at






(iii) If r > α and V2 ≥ 4α (i.e., p ≥ r−rαr−1 r+αr−α), then piRO is maximized at
V = V2, and we have







With all of the results above, the optimal design of top prize V to maximize
the expected profit for p ≥ r−rαr−1 is presented in Propositions 3.5 and 3.6.
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Proposition 3.5. For the model of symmetric workers with ki = ci = 1






, then the optimal top prize is













Conditions for the optimality of the top prize in Proposition 3.5 have two
parts. First, when the productive effort is less effective than the sabotage
effort, both workers have incentives to concentrate on sabotaging their rivals
(if the pay dispersion is large enough) instead of exerting less effective pro-
ductive efforts. This would result in a seriously negative consequence for total
production for the principal. Hence, she can choose the optimal top prize as
the threshold level to achieve the boundary solution in equilibrium such that
neither worker would exert sabotage effort. Second, when productive effort is
more effective than sabotage effort and the unit price is in the intermediate
range, the profit-maximizing choice for the prize is smaller than the threshold
level, which is not achievable, and hence it is also optimal to set the top prize
to correspond to the boundary solution.
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Proposition 3.6. For the model of symmetric workers with ki = ci = 1
(i = 1, 2), if r > α and p ≥ r−rαr−1 ( r+α
r−α
)
, then the optimal top prize is


























(α + 1− r) + 2. (3.19)
The intuition for Proposition 3.6 is that when productive effort is more
effective than sabotage effort and the unit price is sufficiently large, it is op-
timal to induce the mutual-sabotage equilibrium in the contest so that total
production is increased. Therefore, the optimal top prize is greater than the
threshold level, which corresponds to the interior solution in which both work-
ers sabotage each other.
Therefore, in this section we completely pin down the solutions of expected
profit maximization for the principal according to the different ranges of unit
price p in the rank order contest, which also depend on the relationship between
the effectiveness of productive effort and sabotage effort.
3.4 Analysis of piece rate contract
Under the linear piece rate contract scheme (following a similar model of
Lazear (2000)), the payment (or wage) for each worker is based on the ac-
tual number of units he produces. Without loss of generality, we assume that
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the common piece rate is R for both workers, so for each unit of output, worker
i(= 1, 2) is rewarded with R dollars.
In the model of symmetric workers with ki = ci = 1 for i = 1, 2 , from
the perspective of worker i, given the opponent worker’s choices (xj, sj), his














· E(εi)− xi − si.
In order to determine the expected utility EUi, we need to determine the
expectation of εi, where the common random shock εi is assumed to follow the
CDF F (εi) = 1− e−εi . The corresponding PDF of εi is
f(εi) = e
−εi , ∀εi ∈ (0,+∞).




(xe−x)dx = [(−x− 1)e−x]+∞0 = 1.






− xi − si. (3.20)
8Alternatively, as the CDF of εi is F (εi) = 1−e−εi , we can see that εi follows the Weibull





, so the expected value of εi is E(εi) = Γ(2) = (2− 1)! = 1.
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The maximization problem for worker j can be stated in a similar expression.
Furthermore, given the effort choices (xi, si, xj, sj) by two workers and the




piPR =(p−R)(E(qi) + E(qj)).
The optimal piece rate R is solved as follows. First, consider the first order






− 1 = 0.
The second order derivative is negative, which implies that the expected utility
is strictly concave in the productive effort. In addition, the expected utility of
worker i is strictly decreasing in his own sabotage effort si, since
∂EUi
∂si
=− 1 < 0.
So worker i’s optimal choices are
xi(xj, sj) =(Rr)
1




Similarly, with E(εj) = 1, we can solve the maximization problem of ex-
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pected utility for worker j, which yields
xj(xi, si) =(Rr)
1




Combining all of these results, we can see that with the specific piece rate
R under the piece rate contract, the optimal sabotage efforts are s∗i = s
∗
j = 0,






The results show that in the equilibrium with a piece rate contract, neither
worker has incentive to sabotage the opponent, as a positive sabotage effort of
any worker does not contribute to his own production, but adversely increases
his cost.
Therefore, when the unit price of the output is p, the principal’s expected
profit, piPR, is
piPR =(p−R)(E(qi) + E(qj))
































































(1− r)2 (r − 1) < 0,
since r ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the expected profit piPR is strictly concave in piece
rate R at R = pr.
Therefore, we have the following results in Proposition 3.7.
Proposition 3.7. For the model of symmetric workers with ki = ci = 1 (i =
1, 2), under the piece rate contract, the principal’s expected profit is maximized
at
R∗ = pr, (3.23)





1−r (1− r). (3.24)
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3.5 The Comparison
According to the results in Propositions 3.4 to 3.7 under both the rank order
contest and the piece rate contract, we can compare the principal’s optimal
expected profits for different ranges of p with the structural parameters of r
and α. More specifically, we express the difference between the expected profit
under the rank order contest and that under the piece rate contract as
D(p; r, α) =pi∗RO − pi∗PR.
On the one hand, if D(p; r, α) > 0, then the principal prefers the rank order
contest, as it renders a higher expected profit (with the optimal top prize V ∗
determined in Propositions 3.4 to 3.6). On the other hand, if D(p; r, α) < 0,
then the payment scheme of the piece rate contract yields a higher level of
expected profit for the principal (by choosing the optimal piece rate R∗, as
shown in Proposition 3.7).
The maximum expected profit from the optimal piece rate contract pi∗PR
is established in equation (3.24), while there are three subcases in the rank
order contest to derive the optimal expected profit in equations (3.14), (3.17),
and (3.19). We will discuss these comparisons separately. For simplicity of
notation, denote pl = r





, which are the two
threshold values of unit price p, in the following analysis.
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Case I. p ≤ pl
When p ≤ pl, the optimal expected profit from the rank order contest pi∗RO
is shown in equation (3.14). The difference between optimal expected profits
is thus















So it is straightforward to have the result in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. If p ≤ pl(= r−rαr−1), then the maximum expected profit from
the optimal rank order contest is larger than that from the optimal piece rate
contract.
The intuition of Lemma 3.1 is as follows. On the one hand, when the
unit price p is very small, the corresponding optimal prize in the rank order
contest is also small, such that both workers make zero sabotage effort in the
equilibrium; thus there is no efficiency loss in the competition (i.e., achieving
the “first best” production level). On the other hand, under the piece rate
contract the principal would set a relatively low piece rate R for the workers,
since the unit price is small, which does not provide sufficient incentive for
workers to achieve a high level of productions. The overall effects, therefore,
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lead to the larger expected profit of the principal from the optimal rank order
contest.
To illustrate our results in Lemma 3.1, Figure 3.1 shows the difference
of optimal expected profits for p ≤ pl, in which it is assumed that r = 0.3,
α = 0.7, and thus pl = 1.842. We can see that the difference D(p; r, α) is
positive and increasing in the range of p ≤ pl.
Figure 3.1: Difference of profits for p ≤ pl. (r = 0.3, α = 0.7)
Case II. r ≤ α and p ≥ pl
When r ≤ α and p ≥ pl, the optimal expected profit from the rank or-
der contest is shown in equation (3.17). The difference between maximum
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expected profits is thus









− 2p 11−r r 2r1−r (1− r)
=2prrα−r − 2rα−1 − 2p 11−r r 2r1−r (1− r). (3.25)
The first order condition with respect to p is
∂D(p; r, α)
∂p
=2rrα−r − 2p r1−r r 2r1−r ,
which leads to the solution of p˜1 as
p˜1 = r
−r−1αr−1 > pl. (3.26)








1−r < 0, ∀p > 0.
Hence, it is derived that ∂D(p;r,α)
∂p
> 0 for any pl ≤ p < p˜1, and ∂D(p;r,α)∂p < 0 for
any p > p˜1.
At p = pl, the difference is
D(pl; r, α) =2r









In addition, since the difference D(p; r, α) is continuous in p for p ≥ pl, it can
be shown that there exists P1 > pl such that
D(P1; r, α) = 2P1r




1−r (1− r) = 0. (3.27)
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Therefore, when pl ≤ p < P1, the difference D(p; r, α) is strictly positive,
while when p exceeds P1, the difference D(p; r, α) is strictly negative, as it is
a decreasing function. Moreover, the critical value P1 is unique, because the
value of D(p; r, α) is concave in p based on its second order derivative.
These results are summarized in Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2. If r ≤ α and p ≥ pl, then there exists a unique critical price
P1 ∈ (pl,+∞) such that the difference D(P1; r, α) is zero. So for pl ≤ p < P1,
the maximum expected profit from the optimal rank order contest is larger, and
for p > P1, the maximum expected profit from the optimal piece rate contract
is larger.
It is quite intuitive to obtain the results of the comparison in Lemma 3.2.
With the condition of r ≤ α, one worker’s sabotage effort is more effective than
his productive effort. When the unit price is larger than the threshold level, the
principal aims to choose an optimal value for the top prize to extract as much
productive effort as possible and avoid any sabotage effort from workers in the
meantime. In this way, the principal is able to prevent any counterproductive
consequence in the workers’ production, as any sabotage effort would be even
more effective. Hence, although the expected profit of the rank order contest
is still increasing in the unit price (as shown in equation (3.17)), the expected
profit of the piece rate contract would be more significantly driven up by the
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unit price. So there is a cutoff value of the unit price, beyond which the piece
rate contract renders a strictly higher level of profit.
To illustrate our results in Lemma 3.2, Figure 3.2 shows the difference of
optimal expected profits for p ≥ pl in which it is assumed that r = 0.3 and
α = 0.7. Thus, we can see that the difference D(p; r, α) is strictly concave in p
in the range of p ≥ pl, and there is a unique critical price P1 that corresponds
to the zero difference.
Figure 3.2: Difference of profits for p ≥ pl. (r = 0.3, α = 0.7)
Case III. r > α and pl ≤ p ≤ ph
When r > α and pl ≤ p ≤ ph, the maximum expected profit from the
rank order contest is shown in equation (3.17). The difference between the
maximum expected profits, D(p; r, α) is thus the same as the expression of
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(3.25) in Case II, and it is previously verified that the first order derivative
∂D(p;r,α)
∂p
is decreasing for any (positive) p.
At p = pl, it is already shown that D(pl; r, α) > 0. And at p = ph, we have
































Since it is assumed that 0 < α < r here, we can denote the term within the
brackets as
T (r, α) =
r + α



































By checking the range of α in which ∂T (r,α)
∂α
is positive or not, we can solve












. In addition, it can be shown that
lim
α→0









=1− r > 0
lim
α→r
T (r, α) =−∞.
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T (r, α˜1) =
r + α˜1









and hence D(ph; r, α˜1) = 0.
On the one hand, if α ∈ (0, α˜1], then D(ph; r, α) ≥ 0, and hence D(p; r, α) >
0 for any p ∈ [pl, ph) because of the continuity in p. On the other hand, if
α ∈ (α˜1, r), then D(ph; r, α) < 0; since in this case the difference D(p; r, α) is
continuous in p, there exists P2 ∈ (pl, ph) such that
D (P2; r, α) = 2P2r




1−r (1− r) = 0. (3.31)
Hence, if pl ≤ p < P2, D(p; r, α) is positive, and if P2 < p ≤ ph, D(p; r, α) is
negative.
These results are summarized in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3. With the conditions of r > α and p ∈ [pl, ph], the value of α˜1 is
determined in equation (3.30) and the following results hold.
(i) If α ∈ (0, α˜1], then for any p ∈ [pl, ph], the maximum expected profit from
the optimal rank order contest is larger.
(ii) If α ∈ (α˜1, r), then there exists a unique critical price P2 ∈ (pl, ph)
such that the difference D(P2; r, α) is zero in equation (3.31). So when
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pl ≤ p < P2, the maximum expected profit from the optimal rank order
contest is larger, and when P2 < p ≤ ph, the maximum expected profit
from the optimal piece rate contract is larger.
Part (i) of Lemma 3.3 is demonstrated graphically in Figure 3.3, in which
it is assumed that r = 0.6 and α = 0.2. We can see that the range of prices is
pl ≤ p ≤ ph with pl = 2.59 and ph = 5.17, and the difference of optimal profits
is strictly positive in this range, so the optimal rank order contest renders a
higher expected profit.
Figure 3.3: Difference of profits for pl ≤ p ≤ ph. (r = 0.6, α = 0.2)
Part (ii) of Lemma 3.3 is demonstrated graphically in Figure 3.4, in which
it is assumed that r = 0.6 and α = 0.3, where the value of α is relatively
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large. The range of prices is pl ≤ p ≤ ph with pl = 2.2 and ph = 6.6, and the
difference of optimal profits is zero at the critical price P2 = 5.66.
Figure 3.4: Difference of profits for pl ≤ p ≤ ph. (r = 0.6, α = 0.3)
Case IV. r > α and p ≥ ph
When r > α and p ≥ ph, the maximum expected profit from the optimal
rank order contest is shown in equation (3.19). The difference of the maximum
expected profits is thus













(α + 1− r) + 2− 2p 11−r r 2r1−r (1− r).
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Moreover, it is easy to deduce that ∂D(p;r,α)
∂p
> 0 for p ∈ (0, p˜2), and ∂D(p;r,α)∂p < 0
for p ∈ (p˜2,+∞). We can further discuss the difference of the maximum
expected profits based on these conditions.

























, D(p;α, r) is increasing in p for
p ∈ [ph, p˜2) and it is decreasing in p for p ∈ (p˜2,+∞).
At p = ph, the expression of the difference D(ph; r, α) is the same as in
equation (3.28). It is already shown that when 0 < α < r(1−r)
1+r
, we have that
∂D(ph;r,α)
∂α





, it can be verified that D(ph;α, r) > 0,
and then D(p˜2;α, r) > 0 because it is increasing for p ∈ [ph, p˜2].
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Since the difference D(p; r, α) is continuous in p for p ≥ ph with the con-





, there exists a critical value P3 ∈ (ph,+∞) such
that












(α + 1− r)
+ 2− 2(P3) 11−r r 2r1−r (1− r) = 0. (3.33)







, D(p; r, α) is decreasing in p for p ∈ [ph,+∞).
Under this condition, at p = ph, we also have the same expression of
D(ph; r, α) as in equation (3.28), and the sign of the difference D(ph; r, α)























































, we have D(ph; r, α) > 0. Since
∂D(p;r,α)
∂p








, there exists a critical value P4 ∈ (ph,+∞) such that












(α + 1− r)
+ 2− 2(P4) 11−r r 2r1−r (1− r) = 0. (3.35)
As the implicit expression for P4 in equation (3.35) is similar to that for P3
in equation (3.33), we can thus apply either equation to determine the critical
value for the range of α ∈ (0, α˜2).
In addition, when α ∈ (α˜2, r), we have D(ph; r, α) < 0, and equivalently,
the difference of maximum expected profits is negative at p = ph. Since
∂D(p;r,α)
∂p
< 0 for p ∈ [ph,+∞) and D(p; r, α) is continuous in p, it is easy to
derive that with the condition of α ∈ (α˜2, r), we have D(p; r, α) < 0 for any
p ≥ ph.
These results are summarized in Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.4. With the conditions of r > α and p ∈ [ph,+∞], the value of α˜2
is determined in equation (3.34) and the following results hold.
(i) If α ∈ (0, α˜2], then there exists a unique critical price P3 ∈ (ph,+∞)
such that the difference D(P3; r, α) is zero in equation (3.33). So when
ph ≤ p < P3, the maximum expected profit from the optimal rank order
contest is larger, and when p > P3, the maximum expected profit from
the optimal piece rate contract is larger.
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(ii) If α ∈ (α˜2, r), then for any p ∈ [ph,+∞), the maximum expected profit
from the optimal piece rate contract is larger.
Part (i) of Lemma 3.4 is demonstrated in Figure 3.5, in which it is assumed
that r = 0.6 and α = 0.1, where α is less than α˜2 (i.e., sufficiently small). The
graph is drawn in the range of unit price p ≥ ph with ph = 4.78. There is a
unique critical price P3 = 13.08 such that the difference of maximum expected
profits is zero.
Figure 3.5: Difference of profits for p ≥ ph. (r = 0.6, α = 0.1)
Part (ii) of Lemma 3.4 is illustrated in Figure 3.6, in which it is assumed
that r = 0.6 and α = 0.3, where the value of α is greater than α˜2. The graph
is drawn in the range of unit price p ≥ ph with ph = 6.60. From Figure 3.6, we
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can see that with the given parameters of r and α, the difference of maximum
expected profits is strictly negative for any value p ≥ ph.
Figure 3.6: Difference of profits for p ≥ ph. (r = 0.6, α = 0.3)
Moreover, given all the results of the comparison between the two reward
schemes in the four different ranges of unit price from Lemma 3.1 to Lemma
3.4, we can combine them to show how the differences of maximum expected
profits vary with the unit price. As the comparison between the optimal
rank order contest and the optimal piece rate contract depends on structural
parameters (r and α), we demonstrate the combined results in the following
three examples with different combinations of r and α. As for the analysis
previously, the threshold values of unit price are determined by pl = r
−rαr−1








First, we consider the condition r ≤ α, which is that the consequence
of sabotage effort is more effective than that of productive effort. In Figure
3.7, the comparison result with respect to unit price p is demonstrated with
the parameters r = 0.3 and α = 0.7. With the value of pl = 1.84, we need
to aggregate the ranges of p ≤ pl and p ≥ pl. When p is less than pl, the
difference is increasing in p, while when p is greater than pl, the difference
of maximum expected profits is initially increasing, then drops with the unit
price.
Figure 3.7: Comparison results of profits. (r = 0.3, α = 0.7)
From Figure 3.7, we can see that there is a unique critical value of PC1 such
that the difference of expected profits is zero9, which is strictly greater than
9The exact value of the cutoff price can be computed via Matlab, PC1 = 12.72
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pl. Thus, if the unit price is smaller than the critical PC1 , then the expected
profit of optimal rank order contest is higher, or otherwise the expected profit
of optimal piece rate contract is higher.
Second, we consider the condition r > α, meaning that the consequence of
productive effort is more effective than that of sabotage effort, with α being
comparatively small. In Figure 3.8, the comparison result on the two reward
schemes is shown with the parameter values of r = 0.6 and α = 0.2. With
the values of pl = 2.59 and ph = 5.17, we need to check the ranges of p ≤ pl,
pl < p ≤ ph, and p > ph.
Figure 3.8: Comparison results of profits. (r = 0.6, α = 0.2)
From Figure 3.8, we can see that there is a unique critical value of PC2 such
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that the difference of expected profits is zero10, which is strictly greater than
ph. Thus, if the unit price is smaller than the critical PC2 , then the expected
profit of the optimal rank order contest is higher; however, the optimal piece
rate contract yields the higher expected profit if the unit price is larger than
PC .
Third, we consider the condition r > α, with both the productive effort
being more effective and α being sufficiently large. In Figure 3.9, the graph
of the difference of maximum expected profits is drawn with the parameter
values r = 0.6 and α = 0.3. With the values of pl = 2.20 and ph = 6.60, we
need to combine the ranges of p ≤ pl, pl < p ≤ ph, and p > ph as well.
Figure 3.9: Comparison results of profits. (r = 0.6, α = 0.3)
10The exact value of the cutoff price can be computed via Matlab, PC2 = 6.83
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From Figure 3.9, we can see that there is a unique critical value of PC3
such that the difference of expected profits is zero11, which is between pl and
ph given r = 0.6 and α = 0.3. Thus, if the unit price is smaller than the
critical PC3 , the expected profit from the optimal rank order contest is higher,
but the expected profit from the optimal piece rate contract is strictly higher
if the unit price is larger than PC3 .
Therefore, following the approach of examining the difference of optimal
expected profits between the two reward schemes in different conditions from
Lemma 3.1 to Lemma 3.4, we have the formal results in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. For any values of structural parameters r and α, there exists
a unique critical price PC such that the difference of optimal expected profits is
zero. If the unit price p is less than the critical price PC, then the maximum
expected profit from the optimal rank order contest is larger. If the unit price
p is greater than the critical price PC, then the maximum expected profit from
the optimal piece rate contract is larger.
Proof. See Appendix C.1
The results in Theorem 3.1 are succinct and intuitive for determining which
of the two reward schemes is superior. One could conjecture that, from the
principal’s perspective, the rank order contest is dominated by the piece rate
11The exact value of the cutoff price can be computed via Matlab, PC3 = 5.66
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contract with any structural parameters, with the explanation that the work-
ers have the choice of making either productive efforts or sabotage efforts in
a contest, and the principal aims to reduce the negative consequences of sab-
otage. However, the results are the contrary to this conjecture. Following the
exhaustive analyses in Lemmas 3.1 to 3.4, we examine expected profits and
identify plausible critical values for the unit price, at which the difference be-
tween the optimal expected profit from the optimal rank order contest and the
optimal piece rate contract is zero, in individual ranges given the effectiveness
of productive and sabotage efforts. Combining all the cases in an integrated
form, we demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the critical price for
comparison of the reward schemes, which varies with the effectiveness of pro-
ductive and sabotage efforts. It is thus important to note that if and only
if the unit price of output exceeds the critical price, the optimal piece rate
contract is the better choice for the principal, since it leads to a higher level
of expected profit. Conversely, if the unit price is very low, the optimal rank
order contest is superior to the piece rate contract.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the conclusions we derive in Theorem 3.1
about the relative superiority of the rank order contest and the piece rate con-
tract are quite dissimilar from the results obtained by Lazear and Rosen (1981).
In their analysis of optimum labour contracts, Lazear and Rosen demonstrate
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that “though tournaments and piece rates are substantially different institu-
tions for creating incentives,” both reward schemes are efficient and achieve
the Pareto optimal allocation of resources when workers are risk neutral. In
particular, the two reward schemes generate the same expected profits, extract
the same level of effort from workers, and yield the same expected utility to
workers with the condition of risk neutrality, and therefore they are indifferent
in the absence of any distortions, such as additional costs of information ac-
quisition and measurement rectification. In contrast, according to our results
in Theorem 3.1 and, more specifically, in Lemma 3.1, if the unit price p is less
than the threshold value pl and thus in the small range, the optimal rank order
contest and the optimal piece rate contract are still not equivalent from the
principal’s perspective, even though both workers exert zero sabotage effort in
the induced equilibrium12 of the optimal rank order contest. The main reason
for the dissimilar results is attributed to the different model specifications. In
Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) model, the production is additive and consists of a
worker’s effort and a random productive shock term, while in our model the
production function is in multiplicative form, including productive effort and
sabotage effort with different effectiveness parameters, as well as a random
shock. Therefore, the calculations for winning probability for the top prize in
12For the range of p ≤ pl, the optimal design of the rank order contest is established in
Proposition 3.4, with the optimal top prize in equation (3.13).
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Lazear and Rosen and in our model are substantially different. In addition,
in our previous analysis we show that the first-best (i.e., social optimal) out-
come is achievable by an optimally designed pay dispersion,13 which leads to
zero sabotage effort in the equilibrium, and the first-best outcome is gener-
ated through the rank order contest scheme with p being comparatively small
(i.e., under the condition of Lemma 3.1). This comparison result involving the
first-best outcome also justifies the superiority (not equivalence) of the opti-
mal rank order contest over the piece rate contract in the low range of unit
price. Hence, our result for the comparison between the two reward schemes
is intrinsically different from Lazear and Rosen’s conclusion that tournaments
and piece rate contracts are equivalent in terms of Pareto efficient allocations
and the same expected utility of workers.
Furthermore, the results of the comparison between the two reward schemes
are practically significant: the principal can employ the rank order contest or
the piece rate contract in accordance with the realized market price of output
to achieve higher profitability. However, there are other aspects that the prin-
cipal must consider before choosing. For instance, Wu and Roe (2005) look
into the regulation of agricultural production contracts and assess one legisla-
tive proposal that would ban the use of relative performance contracts.14 In
13Liu et al. (2016) also present the details of optimal design of rank order contests, with
different values for pay dispersion.
14The argument is mainly that the payment systems are complex under relative perfor-
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addition, the cost of switching from one reward scheme to the other within
a firm or organization may be substantially high, and outweigh the poten-
tial benefits of the higher expected profit. Such additional factors must be
examined by the principal to determine the proper reward scheme.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
It is important for a firm or organization that the principal chooses a compen-
sation system that will provide sufficient incentives for workers to increase pro-
duction and profits. In this research paper, two reward schemes, the rank order
contest (based on relative performance) and the piece rate contract (based on
absolute performance), are analyzed and compared from the perspective of the
principal. Following Lazear and Rosen (1981), Lazear (1989), and Liu et al.
(2016), there are one employer (the principal) and two workers (the agents)
in the model, and the two symmetric workers have the choice of making pro-
ductive effort or sabotage effort. If a worker makes positive sabotage effort,
it does not contribute to his own production, but rather leads to a reduction
in the opponent worker’s output. For the purpose of maximizing total profit,
in the rank order contest the principal establishes two prizes to be rewarded
on the basis of relative ranking–which is alternatively interpreted as the pay
mance contracts, because it is difficult for growers to forecast their earnings in a given
growing period.
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dispersion by normalizing the second prize as zero–while in the piece rate con-
tract the principal chooses a proper piece rate compensation for the workers,
and thus their relative performance is irrelevant.
We first analyze the optimal design for the two reward schemes and de-
termine the corresponding expected profits. For the rank order contest, the
optimal top prize varies with the unit price of output, as well as the effec-
tiveness of productive and sabotage effort. If the unit price is small, neither
worker exerts sabotage effort in the equilibrium, while if the unit price is very
large, both workers are induced to sabotage each other in the equilibrium and
there is a boost in production. For the piece rate contract, the optimal piece
rate reward is shown to have a linear relationship with the unit price and the
two workers do not exert sabotage effort. Based on exhaustive analysis of
the comparison of maximum expected profits from the rank order contest and
piece rate contract, it is further demonstrated that there is a critical (unit)
price such that the difference between maximum expected profits from two re-
ward schemes is zero. In addition, the optimal piece rate contract is superior
to the optimal rank order contest if and only if the unit price is greater than
the critical price. On the other hand, if the unit price drops below the critical
price, the rank order contest renders a higher level of expected profit for the
principal.
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In this paper, we consider a model with two workers. If there are more
than two workers involved in production, each worker could exert universal
sabotage effort, targeting all of the others, or individual sabotage effort, tar-
geting a particular opponent. Moreover, we focus on the monetary reward of
the principal and the workers in the optimization problems. The utility func-
tions of the principal and the workers may also take other forms; for example,
the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility. We leave these extensions
of the model to future work.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter One
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.2
The following lemmas demonstrate that the equilibrium can be solved uniquely.
Lemma A.1. At most one player bids zero with strictly positive probability.
Proof. We can prove it by contradiction. Suppose both players bid zero with
strictly positive probability; without loss of generality, assume the h type bids
zero with a probability of mh and the l type bids zero with a probability of
ml. Thus there is a tie between them when both of them bid zero.
If the tie-breaking rule is in favor of the h type, then the payoff of the l type
in this case is 0. The l type has the belief of prior distribution on the rival’s
type. Thus, with a deviation from zero to a sufficiently small but positive
bid δl < min{vlmh, vlml}, the l type wins the auction and is able to obtain a
payoff greater than vl(pmh + (1 − p)ml) − δl > 0. It leads to a contradiction
to the assumption that the bid of zero is in the support of the l type’s bidding
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function.
Likewise, if the tie-breaking rule is in favor of the l type, then the payoff of
the h type in this case is 0. Thus, with a deviation from zero to a sufficiently
small but positive bid δh < vhml, the h type wins the auction with a probability
of at least ml (i.e., the probability of the l type bidding zero) and is able to
obtain a payoff greater than vhml − δh > 0. It leads to a contradiction to
the assumption that the bid of zero is in the support of the h type’s bidding
function.
For any other tie-breaking rule at zero bid (e.g., both types have a prob-
ability of 0.5 to win the auction), it is easy to show that both h type and l
type have incentive to deviate from zero to a sufficiently small but positive bid
in order to obtain a higher payoff. Therefore, we can show that there exists
a contradiction under the assumption that both players bid zero with strictly
positive probability. The lemma is thus proved.
Lemma A.2. Supp[Fh(·)] ⊆ Supp[Fl(·)].
Proof. Suppose x ∈ Supp[Fh(·)], but x /∈ Supp[Fl(·)].1 Then there is U(x) as
an open neighborhood of x, such that for all x∗ ∈ U(x), we have Fl(x) = Fl(x∗).
We consider the payoff for the h type, given that the h type knows his opponent
1It is assumed that x > 0. Otherwise, if x = 0, it means that the h type may make a bid
of 0 while the l type does not, i.e. inf(Supp[Fl(·)]) > 0; then the h type has the incentive to
deviate by making a strictly positive bid (instead of 0) to have a higher chance of winning
the prize.
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is the l type when C happens. If he changes the bid from x to x∗ ∈ U(x) with
x∗ < x , it is shown that
pih(x
∗) = vhFl(x∗)− x∗ > pih(x) = vhFl(x)− x.
So the deviation of bidding from x to x∗ improves his payoff, and thus
bidding x cannot be optimal for the h type, contradicting to x ∈ Supp[Fh(·)].
So it is proved that Supp[Fh(·)] ⊆ Supp[Fl(·)].
Lemma A.3. The bidding functions of both types Fi(·) (i = h, l) are continu-
ous on their individual supports.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary z ∈ Supp[Fh(·)].
Suppose Fl(·) is continuous at z, while Fh(·) is not continuous at z, i.e.,
there exists  > 0, such that for all δ < δ() we have Fh(z) > Fh(z − δ) + .
We thus have
pil(z − δ) = vl(pFh(z − δ) + (1− p)Fl(z − δ))− (z − δ)
< vl(p(Fh(z)− 
2
) + (1− p)Fl(z))− (z − δ)
= pil(z) + δ − 
2
pvl
< vl(p(Fh(z + δ)− 
2
) + (1− p)Fl(z + δ))− (z − δ)




Hence, for any δ < min{δ(), 
4
pvl} ≡ δ0, we have
pil(z − δ) < pil(z)− 
4
pvl < pil(z + δ),
which means that the l type will not bid in (z − δ, z + δ). However, for the
h type, he knows the opponent is l type exactly, and thus bidding z is never
optimal for him, contradicting that z ∈ Supp[Fh(·)]. Thus it is proved that if
Fl(·) is continuous at z, then Fh(·) is also continuous at z.
Next, suppose Fh(·) is continuous at z, while Fl(·) is not continuous at z,
i.e., there exists  > 0, such that for all δ < δ() we have Fl(z) > Fl(z− δ) + .
We thus have
pil(z − δ) = vl(pFh(z − δ) + (1− p)Fl(z − δ))− (z − δ)
< vl(pFh(z) + (1− p)(Fl(z)− 
2
))− (z − δ)
= pil(z) + δ − 
2
(1− p)vl
< vl(pFh(z + δ) + (1− p)(Fl(z + δ)− 
2
))− (z − δ)
= pil(z + δ) + 2δ − 
2
(1− p)vl.
Hence, for any δ < min{δ(), 
4
(1− p)vl} ≡ δ0, we have
pil(z − δ) < pil(z)− 
4
(1− p)vl < pil(z + δ),
which means that the l type will not bid in (z − δ, z + δ), contradicting that
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z ∈ Supp[Fh(·)]. Thus if Fh(·) is continuous at z, then Fl(·) is also continuous
at z.
Thirdly, suppose both Fh(·) and Fl(·) are not continuous at z, i.e., there
exists  > 0, such that for all δ < δ() we have Fl(z) > Fl(z − δ) +  and
Fh(z) > Fh(z − δ) + . We thus have
pil(z − δ) = vl(pFh(z − δ) + (1− p)Fl(z − δ))− (z − δ)
< vl(p(Fh(z)− 
2
) + (1− p)(Fl(z)− 
2
))− (z − δ)
= pil(z) + δ − 
2
vl
< vl(p(Fh(z + δ)− 
2
) + (1− p)(Fl(z + δ)− 
2
))− (z − δ)
= pil(z + δ) + 2δ − 
2
vl.
Hence, for all δ < min{δ(), 
4
vl} ≡ δ0, we have
pil(z − δ) < pil(z)− 
4
vl < pil(z + δ),
which means that the l type will not bid in (z − δ, z + δ), contradicting that
z ∈ Supp[Fh(·)].
Last, we show that Fl(·) is continuous at z ∈ Supp[Fl(·)]/Supp[Fh(·)].
Suppose Fl(·) is not continuous at z, i.e., there exists  > 0, such that for all
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δ < δ() we have Fl(z) > Fl(z − δ) + . We thus have
pil(z − δ) = vl(pFh(z − δ) + (1− p)Fl(z − δ))− (z − δ)
= (1− p)vlFl(z − δ)− (z − δ)
< (1− p)vl(Fl(z)− 
2
)− (z − δ)
= pil(z) + δ − 
2
(1− p)vl
< vl(1− p)(Fl(z + δ)− 
2
)− (z − δ)
= pil(z + δ) + 2δ − 
2
(1− p)vl.
Hence, for all δ < min{δ(), 
4
(1− p)vl} ≡ δ0, we have
pil(z − δ) < pil(z)− 
4
(1− p)vl < pil(z + δ),
which means that the l type will not bid in [z − δ, z + δ), contradicting that
z ∈ Supp[Fl(·)] /Supp[Fh(·)].
Lemma A.4. Supp[Fh(·)] = [xh, vl] and Supp[Fl(·)] = [xl, vl], where xh ≥
xl ≥ 0.
Proof. For both types of two players, maximum spending levels must be the
same, which is vl. Without loss of generality, suppose the upper bounds of
bidding of the h type and the l type are s¯h and s¯l, respectively. If s¯h < s¯l, then
considering that the h type knows his opponent’s type exactly, he will make
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a bid slightly more than s¯l and win the auction; so we have s¯h = s¯l. In this
case, the l type’s equilibrium payoff is zero, because if we suppose the l type’s
equilibrium payoff is positive then the h type can slightly increase the bid over
s¯l to lessen the l type’s payoff, contradicting the assumption of equilibrium
payoff.
Moreover, suppose s¯l < vl. In this case, if the l type bids x˜l with s¯l < x˜l <
vl, then his payoff is pil(x˜l) = vl(pFh(x˜l) + (1 − p)Fl(x˜l)) − x˜l = vl − x˜l > 0,
contradicting that the l type’s equilibrium payoff is zero. Consequently, it is
shown s¯h = s¯l = vl. This leads to the result that the h type’s equilibrium payoff
equals to vh− vl, by simply choosing an effort that infinitesimally exceeds the
value vl of the l type. With the result that at most one player places an atom
at zero bid from Lemma A.1, it implies that the mixed strategy of the h type
does not have an atom at zero.
Next, we show that there is no “hole” in either type’s support. Suppose
there is a hole (x, y) with xh ≤ x < y ≤ vl over which Fl(·) is constant, while
x and y belong to the support of Fl(·). We thus have that Fl(x) = Fl(y). In
this case,
pih(x) = vhFl(x)− x > pih(y) = vhFl(y)− y.
Thus, there is also a hole (x, y) over which Fh(x) = Fh(y). However, if this
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holds, we then have
pil(x) = vl(pFh(x) + (1− p)Fl(x))− x > pil(y) = vl(pFh(y) + (1− p)Fl(y))− y.
That is, it can never be optimal for an l type to make a bid at y. Hence, such
a hole (x, y) cannot exist for the l type. On the other hand, since the h type
knows his opponent’s type exactly, such a hole cannot exist in his support
either. Similarly, we can also prove that Fl(·) does not have a hole on the
interval of [xl, xh].
With the previous lemmas, the equilibrium cumulative distribution func-
tions can be obtained uniquely from the equilibrium payoff. We first derive
FCl (x) for x ∈ [x, vl]. The h type knows his opponent is definitely the l type,
so given the common upper bound of bid vl, the equilibrium payoff for the h
type must be vh − vl. For any bid of the h type x ≥ x, his payoff is
pih(x) = vhF
C
l (x)− x = vh − vl.







, ∀x ∈ [x, vl].
We now derive FCl (x) for x ∈ [0, x] by considering the l type’s bid in this
range. The l type’s equilibrium payoff is zero. For any bid of the l type x ≤ x,
his payoff is
pil(x) = vl(1− p)FCl (x)− x = 0.
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Thus, the equilibrium CDF of the l type is
FCl (x) =
x
(1− p)vl ,∀x ∈ [0, x].









We thus pin down the threshold x,
x =
(1− p)(vh − vl)
vh − (1− p)vl vl.
We next pin down FCh (x), for the range of x ∈ [x, vl]. Consider the payoff
for the l type with a bid above x,
pil(x) = vl
(
pFCh (x) + (1− p)FCl (x)
)− x = 0, ∀x ∈ [x, vl]
Clearly, we have FCh (vl) = 1. By construction, we have (1−p)vlFCl (x)−x = 0































)x− (1− p)vh − vl
vh
)
,∀x ∈ [x, vl].
Lastly, we only need to show that the h type has no incentive to bid lower
160






(1− p)vl − x
= (
vh
(1− p)vl − 1)x,
which increases with x ∈ (0, x]. Note that pih(x) = vhFCl (x)− x = vh − vl by
construction of FCl (x). We thus have
pih(x) = vhF
C
l (x)− x < vh − vl, ∀x ∈ [0, x).
Hence, the h type has no incentive to bid lower than x. This completes the
proof of Proposition 1.2.
Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.3
The uniqueness can be obtained similar to that with the (D,C,C) policy. We
first look at case (i), in which p < vl
vh
. The l type knows exactly that his
opponent is the h type. So his payoff with a bid x ∈ [0, vl] is
pil(x) = vlF
C





, ∀x ∈ [0, vl].
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Now pin down the bidding CDF of the l type by considering the payoff
for the h type. The h type knows that he competes against the h type with
probability p and the l type with probability 1 − p. His payoff with a bid
x ∈ [0, vl] is
pih(x) = vh
(
(1− p)FCl (x) + pFCh (x)














1− p, ∀x ∈ [0, vl].
We now consider case (ii), in which p ≥ vl
vh
. Given that the l type always
bids 0, when the h type bids 0, he gets a payoff of (1− p)vh. To derive FCh (·),
we consider the payoff for the h type making a bid x ∈ [0, pvh],
pih(x) = vh
(
(1− p) + pFCh (x)
)− x = (1− p)vh.




, ∀x ∈ [0, pvh].
Then with the strategy of the h type as solved, we need to check whether
the l type has the incentive to deviate from bidding zero. If the l type bids







− x < 0, ∀x ∈ [0, pvh].
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Thus the l type has no incentive to deviate from bidding zero. This completes
the proof of Proposition 1.3.
Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4
The equilibrium is established following the approach Siegel (2014) takes.
With a full concealment disclosure policy, both types hold the same belief
about his opponent’s type as the common prior distribution: He is against an
h type with probability p or an l type with probability 1 − p. We can thus
obtain a symmetric equilibrium.
Notice that the h type of bidder must play strictly higher effort levels
than the l type in equilibrium. Therefore, there are two intervals in the joint
partition. In the top interval, both h types are the ones with the best responses,
and in the bottom interval, both l types are the ones with the best responses.
Start with the top interval. For any two bids 0 < x < y in the top interval,
the equilibrium expected payoffs for the h type are the same, which is shown
as
vh(pFh(x) + (1− p))− x = vh(pFh(y) + (1− p))− y,
Fh(y)− Fh(x)









The length L1 of the top interval is such that in the interval, either type h of
one player exhausts the bidding probability of 1. Because the equilibrium is
symmetric, we thus have






} = pvh. (A.2)
Next, for any two bids 0 < x < y in the bottom interval, the equilibrium
expected payoffs for the l type are the same, which is shown as
(1− p)vlFl(x)− x = (1− p)vlFl(y)− y,
Fl(y)− Fl(x)
y − x =
1
(1− p)vl ,
so the density function of the l type in the bottom interval is
fl(·) = 1
(1− p)vl . (A.3)
We can obtain the length of the bottom interval, L2, as






} = (1− p)vl. (A.4)
The combination of all the above results establishes the equilibrium strate-
gies. Furthermore, the conditions of the two-player auction under the full
164
concealment policy also satisfies the monotonicity condition in Siegel (2014).
Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium we pinned down in Proposition 1.4 is
the unique equilibrium.
The equilibrium expected payoff for the h type for x ∈ [(1−p)vl, (1−p)vl+
pvh] is
vh(p · Fh(x) + (1− p) · 1)− x =vh(x− (1− p)vl
vh
+ 1− p)− x
=(1− p)(vh − vl).
The equilibrium expected payoff for the l type for x ∈ [0, (1− p)vl] is
vl(p · 0 + (1− p)Fl(x))− x = vl x
vl
− x = 0.
Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1.1
With an information disclosure policy of full disclosure, equilibrium in a two-
player auction is established in Proposition 1.1. Thus, the expected effort of
the h type for the type profile of {h, h} is










and the expected effort of the l type for the type profile of {l, l} is











For the type profile of {h, l}, the expected effort of the h type is










and the expected effort of the l type is










Therefore, with the (D,D,D) policy, the weighted averages of expected
effort of the h type and the l type are















Thus, aggregate expected effort under the (D,D,D) policy is




pvh + (1− p)vl
2





p2v2h + (1− p)vhvl + p(1− p)v2l
vh
.
With the (D,C,C) policy, when D happens, the expected effort of the h
type is the same as E1. When C happens, the equilibrium of the two-player





































(2− p)vh − 2(1− p)vl
2(vh − (1− p)vl) vl.


























(1− p)vh + (2p− 1)vl
2(vh − (1− p)vl) vl.
Therefore, with the information disclosure policy of (D,C,C), the weighted
averages of expected effort of the h type and the l type are
Eh(x) |(D,C,C)= pE1 + (1− p)E5 = p
2
vh +
(2− p)vh − 2(1− p)vl
2(vh − (1− p)vl) (1− p)vl,
and
El(x) |(D,C,C)= E6 = (1− p)vh + (2p− 1)vl
2(vh − (1− p)vl) vl.
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Thus, aggregate expected effort under the (D,C,C) policy is




pv2h + 2(1− p)2vhvl − 2(1− p)2v2l
2(vh − (1− p)vl) + (1− p)
(1− p)vh + (2p− 1)vl
2(vh − (1− p)vl) vl
)
=
p2v2h + (1− p)2(1 + 2p)vhvl − (1− p)(1− 2p2)v2l
vh − (1− p)vl .
With the (C,C,D) policy, when D happens, the expected effort of the l
type is the same as E2. When C happens, the equilibrium of the two-player
auction is established in Proposition 1.3. There are two cases.
If p < vl
vh
























Therefore, when p < vl
vh
, the weighted averages of expected effort of the h
type and the l type are




El(x) |(C,C,D)= pE8 + (1− p)E2 = (1− 2p)vh + pvl
2(1− p)vh vl.
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Thus, aggregate expected effort under the (C,C,D) policy if p < vl
vh
is






+ (1− p)(1− 2p)vh + pvl
2v(1− p)h vl
)





Similarly, if p ≥ vl
vh













and the expected effort of the l type is zero,
E10 = E
C
l (x) = 0.
Therefore, if p ≥ vl
vh
, the weighted averages of expected efforts of the h type
and the l type are




El(x) |(C,C,D)= pE10 + (1− p)E2 = 1− p
2
vl.
Thus, aggregate expected effort under the (C,C,D) policy if p ≥ vl
vh
is






+ (1− p)(1− p)vl
2
)
= p2vh + (1− p)2vl.
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With the disclosure policy of full concealment, the equilibrium of a two-
player auction is established in Proposition 1.4. Expected effort of the h type





















Thus, aggregate expected effort under the (C,C,C) policy is






+ (1− p)vl) + (1− p)(1− p)vl
2
)
= p2vh + (1− p2)vl.
Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Given the prior distribution of types, the expected payoff for each player, pi,
is
pi = ppih + (1− p)pil,
where pih and pil are the expected payoffs for the h type and the l type, re-
spectively. For either type of player, he competes against another h type with
probability p or against another l type with probability (1− p).
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Under the (D,D,D) policy, according to Proposition 1.1, the expected
payoffs for both types are
pih |(D,D,D) = p · 0 + (1− p) · (vh − vl) = (1− p)(vh − vl),
pil |(D,D,D) = p · 0 + (1− p) · 0 = 0.
So the expected payoff for each player is
pi |(D,D,D)= ppih |(D,D,D) +(1− p)pil |(D,D,D)= p(1− p)(vh − vl).
Under the (D,C,C) policy, according to Proposition 1.2, the expected
payoffs for both types are
pih |(D,C,C) = p · 0 + (1− p) · (vh − vl) = (1− p)(vh − vl),
pil |(D,C,C) = 0.
So the expected payoff for each player is
pi |(D,C,C)= ppih |(D,C,C) +(1− p)pil |(D,C,C)= p(1− p)(vh − vl).
Under the (C,C,D) policy, there are two cases.
(i) If p < vl
vh
, then according to Proposition 1.3 the expected payoffs for
both types are
pih |(C,C,D) = vh − vl,
pil |(C,C,D) = 0.
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So the expected payoff for each player is
pi |(C,C,D)= ppih |(C,C,D) +(1− p)pil |(C,C,D)= p(vh − vl).
(ii) If p ≥ vl
vh
, then according to Proposition 1.3 the expected payoffs for
both types are
pih |(C,C,D) = (1− p)vh,
pil |(C,C,D) = 0.
So the expected payoff for each player is
pi |(C,C,D)= ppih |(C,C,D) +(1− p)pil |(C,C,D)= p(1− p)vh.
Under the (C,C,C) policy, according to Proposition 1.4, the expected pay-
offs for both types are
pih |(C,C,C) = (1− p)(vh − vl),
pil |(C,C,C) = 0.
So the expected payoff for each player is
pi |(C,C,C)= ppih |(C,C,C) +(1− p)pil |(C,C,C)= p(1− p)(vh − vl).
Q.E.D.
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 1.3
It is easy to see that the prize is definitely allocated to the h type when the
type profile is {h, h}, and it is definitely allocated to the l type when the type
profile is {l, l}. As a result, we only need to characterize the probability that
the prize will be allocated to the h type when the type profile is {h, l}; given
the prior distribution of types, we can express Pr(H) as
Pr(H) = p2 · 1 + (1− p)2 · 0 + 2p(1− p) · Pr(H)|{h,l}.
Under the full disclosure policy, the mixed strategy equilibrium is derived
in Proposition 1.1. Thus, the probability that the prize will be allocated to
the h type is














The expected probability of allocating the prize to the h type under the
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full disclosure policy is thus
Pr(H) |(D,D,D)=p2 · 1 + (1− p)2 · 0 + 2p(1− p) · Pr(H)|{h,l}
=p2 + 2p(1− p)2vh − vl
2vh
=
p((2− p)vh − (1− p)vl)
vh
.
Under the (D,C,C) policy, when C happens, the equilibrium of a two-
player auction is established in Proposition 1.2. Thus, the probability that
the prize will be allocated to the h type is












2vh − (2− p)vl
2(vh − (1− p)vl) .
The expected probability of allocating the prize to the h type under the
(D,C,C) policy is thus
Pr(H) |(D,C,C)=p2 · 1 + (1− p)2 · 0 + 2p(1− p) · Pr(H)|{h,l}
=p2 + 2p(1− p) 2vh − (2− p)vl
2(vh − (1− p)vl)
=
p((2− p)vh − 2(1− p)vl)
vh − (1− p)vl .
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Under the (C,C,D) policy, when C happens, the equilibrium of a two-
player auction is established in Proposition 1.3. If p < vl
vh
, then the probability
that the prize will be allocated to the h type is













(2− p)vh − vl
2(1− p)vh .
The expected probability of allocating the prize to the h type under the
(C,C,D) policy when p < vl
vh
is thus
Pr(H) |(C,C,D)=p2 · 1 + (1− p)2 · 0 + 2p(1− p) · Pr(H)|{h,l}






On the other hand, if p ≥ vl
vh
, then the probability that the prize will be
allocated to the h type is
Pr(H)|{h,l} = Pr(xl < xh)|{h,l} = 1.
The expected probability of allocating the prize to the h type under the
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(C,C,D) policy when p ≥ vl
vh
is thus
Pr(H) |(C,C,D)=p2 · 1 + (1− p)2 · 0 + 2p(1− p) · Pr(H)|{h,l}
=p2 + 2p(1− p)
=2p− p2.
Under the full concealment policy, the equilibrium of a two-player auction
is established in Proposition 1.4. Thus, the probability that the prize will be
allocated to the h type is
Pr(H)|{h,l} = Pr(xl < xh)|{h,l} = 1.
The expected probability of allocating the prize to the h type under the
full concealment policy is thus
Pr(H) |(C,C,C)=p2 · 1 + (1− p)2 · 0 + 2p(1− p) · Pr(H)|{h,l}





Proofs of Chapter Two
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
It is clear that ki = kj yields ∆Vl = ∆Vh. We now turn to the second part.














































































































































Since ki > kj > 0, and α ∈ (0, 1), all the three terms in the bracket are
positive. Hence, ∆Vh is strictly greater than ∆Vl when ki > kj. Similarly
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∆Vl < ∆Vh holds when ki < kj.
Q.E.D.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
For the pure strategy equilibrium in which neither of the workers sabotages
the other one, the ranges of ei and ej are












and the cost functions of worker i and j are in the similar form as equation




















































































Therefore, the sufficient and necessary condition on ∆V for the case that
neither worker sabotages the other is













So it is shown that ei = x
r
i (1 + si)
α = xri and ej = x
r
j(1 + sj)
α = xrj . Since e
∗
i























The solutions of x∗i and x
∗
j in (2.19) and (2.21) are thus solved from these two
equations.
For the uniqueness of equilibrium, please refer to the proofs of Proposition
2.2.
Q.E.D.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
With the reference to the inequality










it is shown that under the condition of ki > kj, the range of ∆V for the




























































tion of ki > kj, which is true if either ci ≥ cj or ci < cj.
We next establish a sufficient and necessary condition for an equilibrium in
































Since ki > kj, it indicates that worker j has a relatively lower cost of
sabotage effort. So we firstly verify the existence of an equilibrium in which
only worker j sabotages worker i while worker i does not sabotage. Then the







































































































The equation (B.8) is an implicit solution of ej as a function of ∆V . Then
it is necessary to check that with this implicit solution, the requirement (B.6)





















































































. Therefore, given the range of ∆V in (B.4),
the requirement on ej in (B.6) is satisfied.
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The equation (B.10) is an implicit solution of ei as a function of ∆V . Then
it is necessary to check that with this implicit solution, the requirement (B.5)


































































































. Therefore, given the range of ∆V in
(B.4), the requirement on ei in (B.5) is satisfied.
Therefore, under the assumption of ki > kj as well as the range of ∆V
shown in (B.4), there exists an equilibrium such that only worker j sabotages
worker i.
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In addition, we can verify the uniqueness of the equilibrium. With ki > kj,
if there exists an equilibrium such that neither worker sabotages the other,











Please refer to the proof of Proposition 2.1 for details.
Moreover, if there exists an equilibrium such that both workers sabotage




















Please refer to the proof of Proposition 2.3 for details.
However, with the range of ∆V in (B.4), neither of these inequalities can
be satisfied. Therefore, the two kinds of above-mentioned equilibria cannot
exist given (B.4).
To complete the proof, we next establish that there exists no equilibrium
in which only the player with higher marginal sabotage conducts positive sab-
otage effort. Suppose on the contrary that with ki > kj, there exists an
equilibrium in which only player i sabotages worker j, which is equivalent to
a situation where the player with relatively larger marginal cost of sabotage
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> 0. From the requirement on ei in (B.11),






























































































































































































































Since ki > kj and α ∈ (0, 1), all the three terms in the numerator are
positive. Alternatively speaking, it is verified that under the condition of
ki > kj, the two inequalities (B.14) and (B.15) are contradictory. Note that
this result holds for either ci ≥ cj or ci < cj.
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Therefore, under the condition of ki > kj, the equilibrium is unique, and
in the equilibrium only worker j sabotages worker i, or equivalently only the
worker with relatively lower marginal cost of sabotage makes a positive level of
sabotage effort. Moreover, the relationship between the two workers’ marginal
cost of productive effort (ci and cj) does not play a critical rule.
Q.E.D.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
For the pure strategy equilibrium in which both workers sabotage each other,
the ranges of ei and ej are












and the cost functions of worker i and j are in the similar form as equation













































































In this case, it is required that e∗i > Bi and e
∗













































Therefore, the sufficient and necessary condition on ∆V for the equilibrium
characterized by both workers sabotaging each other is






































ing the definition of Φ in (2.8). With the solutions of e∗i and e
∗


















































































































The solutions of s∗i and s
∗
j in (2.24) and (2.26) are thus pinned down.
Moreover, we have e∗i = (x
∗
i )
r(1 + s∗i )
α and e∗j = (x
∗
j)
r(1 + s∗i )
α by their


























































































































The solutions of x∗i and x
∗
j in (2.23) and (2.25) are thus pinned down.
For the uniqueness of equilibrium, please refer to the proofs of Proposition
2.2.
Q.E.D.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Parts (ii) and (iv) are straightforward.
Part (i): When ci 6= cj, the partial derivative of ∆V c from (2.27) with
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> 0. On the other hand, if ci = cj, clearly the variation of
the parameter r does not influence ∆V c by (2.27).






























Therefore, if ci > cj, we have
∂∆V c
∂ci




Note ∆V c is minimized only if ci = cj, which means that any change in ci
or cj would increase ∆V
c.
Q.E.D.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Part (i) is straightforward. We now consider part (ii), i.e. the impact of r.
According to Nti (2004) and Wang (2010), there exists a cutoff cˆ ≈ 4.68 such
that if
max{ci,cj}
min{ci,cj} ≤ cˆ, the total effort x∗i + x∗j increases with r ∈ (0, 1]; and if
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max{ci,cj}
min{ci,cj} ≥ cˆ, there exists an rˆ (< 1), which decreases with
max{ci,cj}
min{ci,cj} , such that
the total effort x∗i + x
∗
j increases with r on (0,rˆ] and decreases with r on (rˆ, 1];
Note both x∗i and x
∗
j are simply proportional to their sum. Therefore, both x
∗
i
and x∗j satisfy the same property.
We now turn to the impact of ci and cj. It is sufficient to check the
partial derivatives with one parameter only. For instance, consider the partial









































< 0, we can see that when ci increase, the optimal productive
effort of this worker x∗i will decrease. Furthermore,
∂x∗j
∂ci
> 0 if ci < cj, and
∂x∗j
∂ci
< 0 if ci > cj.
Q.E.D.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6
The proof of part (i) is similar with the proof in B.6.
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and hence, the equilibrium sabotage effort s∗ increases with α. The partial













and hence, the equilibrium sabotage effort s∗ decreases with k.

















































On the one hand, if ci = cj, then
∂s∗
∂r
= 0 and hence the change of parameter
r does not affect the equilibrium sabotage effort s∗. On the other hand, if
ci 6= cj, it can be verified that ∂s∗∂r < 0, so the equilibrium sabotage effort s∗
decreases with r.

































If ci > cj, then
∂s∗
∂ci
< 0 and ∂s
∗
∂cj
> 0, and hence s∗ decreases with ci and




the increasing of cj leads to
∂s∗
∂cj
< 0. So with the condition of ci = cj, any
increasing of ci or cj would decrease the equilibrium sabotage effort s
∗.
Q.E.D.
B.8 Proof of Corollary 2.1
(i) It is already shown that the sufficient and necessary condition of ∆V for
the equilibrium in which neither of the workers sabotages the other is the
inequality (B.3). For the analysis of the model with symmetric players, it can
be changed with ci = cj = c and ki = kj = k for i 6= j, which yields the
inequality ∆V < 4k
α
. Furthermore, with ∆V = 4k
α
, the workers make zero
sabotage efforts in the equilibrium as well. Hence, the sufficient and necessary
condition is ∆V ≤ 4k
α
.
Given that ∆V ≤ 4k
α
in the model with ci = cj = c and ki = kj = k, it can







As it is already given that ei = x
r
i (1 + si)
α for the determination of the
winning probability and that si = 0 in the equilibrium with zero sabotage
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which is equation (2.31).
(ii) It is shown that the sufficient and necessary condition of ∆V for the
equilibrium in which both workers sabotage each other is the inequality (B.20).
For the analysis regarding symmetric players, it can be changed with ci = cj =
c and ki = kj = k for i 6= j, yielding the inequality ∆V > 4kα as the condition
for the existence of the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Given the condition ∆V > ∆VS with ci = cj = c and ki = kj = k, the


















In the equilibrium with both workers making positive sabotage efforts, it
is shown that Φ = (1 + s)α. Hence, the expression of s(∆V ) in (2.34) is easily
derived from (B.23). Furthermore, by definition, e ≡ xr(1 + s)α, so from the




B.9 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Let ξ = r
r
1−r . We have ln ξ = r
1−r ln r, and hence
(ln ξ)′ = (1− r)−2Ψ,
where Ψ = ln r + (1− r). Ψ increases with r and reaches 0 when r = 1. Thus
(ln ξ)′ ≤ 0,
which means that r
r
1−r decreases with r.









B.10 Proof of Corollary 2.2
When k ≥ αr r1−r , Proposition 2.7 states that
∆V ∗ = ∆V FB = 4r
r
1−r ,
which is independent of k.
When k < αr
r
1−r , we need to consider two cases: α ≥ r and α < r.
Case I: α ≥ r.
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In this case, Proposition 2.8 states that




which increases with k.
Case II: α < r.










which increases with k.






















which increases with k.
Since ∆V ∗ is continuous in k, the result of Corollary 2.2 holds.
Q.E.D.
B.11 Proof of Corollary 2.3
When α ≤ kr− r1−r , Proposition 2.7 states that
∆V ∗ = ∆V FB = 4r
r
1−r ,
which does not depend on α.
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When α > kr−
r
1−r , i.e. k < αr
r
1−r , we need to consider two cases: α ≥ r
or α < r.
Case I: α ≥ r.
In this case, Proposition 2.8 states that




which decreases with α.
Case II: α < r.











which decreases with α.







1−r , we have














A monotonic transformation leads to that
ln ∆V ∗ = ln 4 +
r
1− r + α ln r +
α














Taking the first order derivative yields
d ln ∆V ∗
dα
=− (r ln r) 1
(1− r + α)2 +
[
1
1− r + α −
α


































(1− r + α)2 ,
where










+ (1− r + α)
(
1











ln(r − α) + [(1− r) + α] 1
r − α
}
+ (1− r + α) 1
r + α
. (B.24)
Because d(r ln r−r)/dr = ln r ≤ 0 if r ≤ 1 and r ln r−r = −1 when r = 1,
we have
r ln r + 1− r + α ≥ α.
Subtracting ln(r + α) from both sides of the above inequality yields
[r ln r + (1− r) + α]− ln(r + α) ≥ α− ln(1 + α).
The right hand side of the inequality is increasing in α and reaches its
minimum 0 when α = 0. Therefore, the left hand side of the inequality, which
is also the first term of expression (B.24), is non-negative.
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The second term of expression (B.24), i.e.
[−(1− r) ln ( k
α
)]
, is also positive




1−r < 1, and 1− r ≥ 0.
To examine the sign of the third term of expression (B.24), let us define
r˜ ≡ r − α where α ∈ [0, r).
The third term of expression (B.24) can then be rewritten as
ϕ(r˜) = ln r˜ + (1− r˜)1
r˜
.
Since ϕ′(r˜) ≤ 0, ϕ(r˜) reaches its minimum ϕ(r) = ln r + (1 − r)1
r
at r˜ = r.
Consequently, ϕ(r) reaches its minimum ϕ(1) = 0 at r = 1. Therefore,
ln(r − α) + (1− r + α) 1
r − α ≥ 0.
Clearly, the last term of expression (B.24), (1− r + α) 1
r+α
is positive ∀r ∈
(0, 1] and α ∈ (0, r). Therefore, we have Ψ ≥ 0 and thus
d ln ∆V ∗
dα
≤ 0,
which means that ∆V ∗ decreases with α.
Since ∆V ∗ is continuous in α and the thresholds adopted above for k are
differentiable in α, the above results mean that Corollary 3 holds.
Q.E.D.
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B.12 Proof of Corollary 2.4
When k ≥ αr r1−r , Proposition 2.7 states that
∆V ∗ = ∆V FB = 4r
r
1−r ,
which decreases with r according to Lemma 2.2.
When k < αr
r
1−r , we need to consider two cases: α ≥ r or α < r.
Case I: α ≥ r.
Proposition 2.8 states that




which does not depend r.
Case II: α < r.





1−r ), we have




which does not depend r.
When k ≤ αr r1−r ( r−α
r+α
) 1
1−r , Proposition 2.8 states that














and ∆V ∗ is non-monotonic as illustrated by Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the relationship between ∆V ∗ and r when k = 0.01
and α = 0.04. For the selected parameters, the first best is not achievable
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regardless of the value of r. The two kink points (rl, ru) correspond to the two
solutions of r for the following equation







The figure shows that ∆V ∗ = ∆VS if r < rl or r ∈ (ru, rˆ) where rˆ is the
solution of k = α · rˆ rˆ1−rˆ . In these two regions, the equilibrium sabotage effort
is 0. When rl < r < ru, ∆V
∗ first increases with r and then decreases with r.




Proofs of Chapter Three
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
To prove the theorem, we consider the maximum expected profits of the opti-
mal rank order contest and optimal piece rate contract in individual ranges of
unit price.
For p ≤ r−rαr−1, Lemma 3.1 shows that the maximum expected profit from
the optimal rank order contest is larger. Thus, the critical price PC is not lower
than p ≤ r−rαr−1. For p ≥ r−rαr−1, we must consider the relationship between
the effectiveness of productive effort r and the effectiveness of sabotage effort
α.
If r ≤ α, Lemma 3.2 states that there is a critical value P1 ∈ (r−rαr−1,+∞)
as the indifference point between the two reward schemes, which yields the
same level of expected profits. Thus, under the condition of r ≤ α, the critical
price PC is defined as PC ≡ P1, and the maximum expected profit from the
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optimal piece rate contract is larger if and only if the unit price is greater than
PC .
If r > α, we can compare their expected profits in the two ranges of unit
price.
(1) For r−rαr−1 ≤ p ≤ r−rαr−1 ( r+α
r−α
)
(i.e., p is in the intermediate range),
Lemma 3.3 shows that if α is sufficiently small, the maximum expected profit
from the optimal rank order contest is larger, and thus the critical price






. On the other hand, if α is large and






as the indifference point between the two reward
schemes. Thus, in this range the critical price PC is defined as PC ≡ P2.
(2) For p ≥ r−rαr−1 ( r+α
r−α
)
(i.e., p is in the high range), Lemma 3.4 demon-
strates that if α is sufficiently small, the critical value is P3 ∈ (p˜2,+∞) or
P4 ∈ (ph,+∞) depending on whether α < r(1−r)1+r or α ≥ r(1−r)1+r . Therefore, we
define the critical price PC as PC ≡ P3 or PC ≡ P4 under the corresponding
conditions. In addition, if α is large and in the range of (α˜2, r), it is proved that
the unit price exceeds the critical price PC , and hence the maximum expected
profit from the optimal piece rate contract is greater.
In the analysis above, we show that for all plausible values of r and α, we
can always pin down the critical price PC for comparison of the two reward
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schemes. If the unit price is below PC , the maximum expected profit from
the optimal rank order contest is larger; otherwise, the optimal piece rate
contract yields a higher expected profit. In particular, it is also verified that
PC ≥ r−rαr−1. Q.E.D.
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